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1 
THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND THE 
LIMITS OF CIVIL LIABILITY 
Dr. Ronen Perry* 
Abstract: This Article uses the unprecedented disaster in the Gulf of Mexico as an 
opportunity to critically evaluate the law pertaining to civil liability for oil pollution before 
and after the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act. This topic is analyzed as a derivative of a 
more general concern, namely the internal harmony of civil liability regimes. The Article 
unveils a general incongruity in American land-based and maritime tort law that surfaced 
through the Exxon Valdez litigation, and examines whether subsequent statutory reform has 
eliminated the problem in the limited context of marine oil pollution, using the Deepwater 
Horizon incident as a test case. 
Part I systematically discusses pre-OPA law. It focuses mainly on two salient features of 
the Exxon Valdez litigation, namely exclusion of liability for purely economic losses, and 
punitive damages. Part II explains why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to incongruity on the 
justificatory level, delineates the contours of the problem, and proposes a conceptual 
framework for resolution. Part III examines whether the enactment of the OPA has created a 
more defensible liability regime. 
Following the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, there have been calls for raising the OPA 
liability caps or an even more comprehensive legislative reform. While some of the 
initiatives seem to have waned, this catastrophic incident, like the earlier Exxon Valdez case, 
will surely leave its mark. This article, which highlights relevant policy concerns, will 
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On April 20, 2010, while drilling at the Macondo Prospect, a seabed 
location about forty-one miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana, an 
explosion occurred on the Deepwater Horizon, a mobile offshore drilling 
rig.1 The rig was owned and operated by Transocean, the world’s largest 
offshore drilling contractor, and leased to BP, one of the world’s largest 
energy companies and the lessee and principal operator of the Macondo 
field.2 The explosion caused a blowout (an uncontrollable escape of oil), 
killed eleven workers, and ignited a fire that led to the sinking of the 
rig.3 After the explosion, an attempt to activate the blowout preventer 
(BOP) failed, and oil started gushing into the Gulf of Mexico, causing 
horrific harm to the marine environment, fouling the shores of Alabama, 
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi, and resulting in multibillion dollar 
losses to the fishing and tourism industries, among others.4 On July 15, 
nearly three months after the deadly explosion, BP announced that it had 
capped the hemorrhaging well, stopping the flow of crude oil into the 
Gulf.5 On August 3 through 4, heavy drilling mud, followed by cement, 
was pumped from a surface vessel through a choke line into the blowout 
                                                      
1. H.R. REP. NO. 111-521, at 5 (2010). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See Bryan Walsh, With Oil Spill (and Blame) Spreading, Obama Will Visit Gulf, TIME, May 1, 
2010, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1986323,00.html (“[T]he Louisiana fishing 
industry could sustain $2.5 billion in losses, while Florida could lose $3 billion in tourism 
income.”). 
5. See Campbell Robertson & Henry Fountain, BP Caps Its Leaking Well, Stopping the Oil After 
86 Days, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/us/16spill.html. 
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preventer to completely seal the well.6 Two relief wells were drilled to 
ensure permanent plugging of the gusher,7 and on September 19 a 
federal official announced that the Macondo well was effectively dead.8 
But while the flow has stopped, the legal saga has only just begun. 
More than two decades ago, the Exxon Valdez oil spill shocked 
America. The notorious supertanker ran aground on Bligh Reef off the 
Alaskan coast on March 24, 1989, spilling eleven million gallons of 
crude oil into Prince William Sound.9 Exxon spent $2.1 billion in 
cleanup efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations occasioning fines, 
settled a civil action by the United States and Alaska, and paid $303 
million in voluntary settlements with private parties, principally 
fishermen.10 Subsequent civil litigation has spanned nearly two decades. 
This litigation resulted in a $287 million compensatory damages award 
to commercial fishermen and a settlement with Alaska Natives,11 and 
culminated in a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling on the proper amount 
of punitive damages.12 At the time, the Exxon Valdez spill was the worst 
environmental disaster in U.S. history.13 But it has been dwarfed by the 
Deepwater Horizon catastrophe, which can now claim the dubious title 
of the world’s largest accidental release of oil. According to the most 
recent estimate, 4.9 million barrels (more than 200 million gallons) of oil 
were released from the well, of which approximately 800,000 barrels 
were captured by BP, leaving more than four million barrels to gush into 
the Gulf.14 BP spent billions of dollars on containment and cleanup.15 
Nearly 170,000 claims were submitted to BP’s claims offices, and later 
to the Gulf Coast Claims Facility,16 by September 3.17 Over two hundred 
                                                      
6. See Clifford Krauss, ‘Static Kill’ of the Well is Working, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/us/05spill.html. 
7. See id.; Henry Fountain, Relief Well to Be Completed in Gulf, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/14/us/14spill.html. 
8. Henry Fountain, U.S. Says BP Well Is Finally ‘Dead’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/us/20well.html. 
9. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 476–78 (2008).  
10. Id. at 479. 
11. Id. at 481. 
12. Id. at 489–514. 
13. See George J. Church, The Big Spill: Bred from Complacency, the Valdez Fiasco Goes from 
Bad to Worse to Worst Possible, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 38. 
14. See Campbell Robertson, U.S. Puts Oil Spill Total at Nearly 5 Million Barrels, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/03/us/03flow.html. 
15. Press Release, BP, Update on Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill (Sept. 3, 2010), 
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7064849. 
16. “The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (‘GCCF’) is an independent claims facility for submission 
and resolution of claims of Individuals and Businesses for costs and damages incurred as a result of 
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lawsuits—representing tens of thousands of victims—were filed against 
BP by mid-June 2010,18 and Gulf coast states sought payouts for lost 
revenue and other damages.19 BP, Transocean, and other parties will 
probably spend many years litigating these claims and negotiating 
settlements. 
This Article, which follows up on my recently published work,20 uses 
the unprecedented disaster in the Gulf of Mexico as an opportunity to 
critically evaluate the law pertaining to civil liability for oil pollution 
before and after the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).21 This 
topic is analyzed as a derivative of a more general concern: the internal 
harmony of civil liability regimes. This Article unveils a general 
incongruity in American land-based and maritime tort law that surfaced 
through the Exxon Valdez litigation, and examines whether subsequent 
statutory reform has eliminated the problem in the limited context of 
marine oil pollution, using the Deepwater Horizon incident as a test 
case. 
The emphasis on the award of punitive damages in recent literature on 
the Exxon Valdez spill has overshadowed an extremely important part of 
the litigation, namely the wholesale rejection of numerous claims for 
purely economic loss by the federal district courts in the early 1990s. 
Thus, on the one hand, liability for economic loss was strictly limited 
under the exclusionary rule instituted in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. 
v. Flint,22 leaving many victims of the Exxon Valdez disaster 
uncompensated.23 On the other hand, liability was expanded through an 
award of punitive damages to relatively few successful claimants. While 
these two components of the litigation might not seem incompatible 
                                                      
the oil discharges due to the Deepwater Horizon incident on April 20, 2010 . . . . BP has agreed to 
contribute funds to an escrow account to be used to pay claims submitted to the GCCF.” Frequently 
Asked Questions, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, http://www.gulfcoastclaimsfacility.com/faq (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2011). 
17. See Press Release, supra note 15. 
18. See Jef Feeley & Margaret C. Fisk, BP Suits Should Be Sent to New Orleans, U.S. Says, 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 17, 2010, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-17/bp-suits-should-
be-sent-to-new-orleans-u-s-says-update2-.html. 
19. Neil King et al., States Weigh Big Claims Against BP, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704846004575332932978558908.html. 
20. Ronen Perry, Economic Loss, Punitive Damages, and the Exxon Valdez Litigation, 45 GA. L. 
REV. 407 (2011) [hereinafter Perry, The Exxon Valdez]; Ronen Perry, The Economic Bias in Tort 
Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573 [hereinafter Perry, The Economic Bias]. 
21. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 507 (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701–2719) (2006). 
22. 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
23. But see infra notes 260–71 and accompanying text. 
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from a simple doctrinal perspective, they are inconsistent on a deeper 
theoretical level. 
The exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine are both 
exceptions to general principles of private law. The rule barring recovery 
for purely economic loss is an exception to the general principle that one 
whose unreasonable conduct caused foreseeable harm to another is liable 
for that harm, which is probably the most fundamental principle in 
modern tort law.24 The exclusionary rule reduces the extent of liability to 
prevent adverse consequences, such as over-deterrence or undue 
punishment.25 Punitive damages are an exception to the general principle 
that tort damages should restore the victim to the pre-tort condition 
(restitutio in integrum), which is the most fundamental principle in the 
modern law of remedies.26 These damages are used as a supplementary 
sanction in exceptional cases where compensatory damages do not 
provide the necessary levels of deterrence and retribution.27 
When both the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine 
are applicable to a particular case, they simultaneously increase and 
decrease the wrongdoer’s liability. The exclusionary rule limits liability 
to prevent over-deterrence, over-punishment, etc., whereas the punitive 
damages doctrine expands liability to enhance deterrence and 
retribution. When applied in tandem these rules cancel out each other’s 
allegedly legitimate effects. Increasing and decreasing liability 
simultaneously is unwarranted not only because it makes the application 
of at least one rule frivolous, but also because it comes at the price of 
two problematic deviations from general principles of private law, along 
with a distributive concern: numerous plaintiffs are denied recovery for 
actual losses caused by the defendants’ wrongdoing, while others obtain 
damages that significantly exceed their actual loss. 
This Article thus sets out to elucidate a general problem that surfaced 
in an oil pollution case, and to examine whether it has been solved in the 
limited context of marine oil pollution by the OPA. Part I discusses pre-
OPA laws applicable to marine oil spills using the Exxon Valdez incident 
as a test case. Part II explains why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to 
                                                      
24. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Recovery for 
Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773, 773 (2006) (explaining that the no-recovery rule is an 
exception to general negligence doctrine). 
25. See infra Part I.A.1.a. 
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979); cf. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 
920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958) (“The fundamental principle of damages is to restore the injured 
party . . . to the position he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other party.”). 
27. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
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incongruity on the justificatory level, delineates the contours of this 
problem, and proposes a conceptual framework for resolution. 
Generally, it holds that where liability must be expanded beyond the 
limits set by the exclusionary rule in order to obtain certain levels of 
deterrence and retribution, relaxing the exclusionary rule and allowing 
more victims to recover is a more defensible path than awarding punitive 
damages to very few claimants. The former simply extends the 
application of two general principles of tort law, whereas the latter is 
based on problematic exceptions to these universal principles and 
generates distributive injustice. Part III examines whether the enactment 
of the OPA has created a more defensible liability regime, using the 
Deepwater Horizon incident as a test case. Note that although the 
problem identified in this Article is manifested in the Exxon Valdez 
litigation, it is not limited to oil spills. Therefore, even if the OPA has 
provided a more defensible liability regime, it has done so only with 
respect to marine oil pollutions. The general problem still stands and has 
to be resolved through judicial creativity or legislative reform. 
Three methodological comments must be made at this stage. First, 
while civil liability for oil pollution has been the subject of international 
conventions for decades, the United States has chosen to hew its own 
way and not to join the international system. In 1969, following the 
Torrey Canyon spill in the English Channel,28 an international 
conference adopted the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage (known as the CLC).29 The CLC imposed strict 
but limited liability on owners of ships from which oil was discharged 
for cleanup costs and private damages and introduced compulsory 
liability insurance.30 The International Convention on the Establishment 
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage,31 
adopted two years later, set up an international fund which provided 
compensation in excess of the vessel owner’s liability under the CLC, or 
where the owner is insolvent or not liable under the CLC.32 The original 
                                                      
28. See Mans Jacobsson, Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Caused by Oil Spills from 
Ships and the International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, 29 MARINE POLLUTION BULL. 378, 
378 (1994); Beth Van Hanswyk, The 1984 Protocols to the International Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damages and the International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damages: An Option for Needed Reform in United States Law, 22 INT’L LAW. 319, 320–21 (1988); 
Sidney A. Wallace & Temple L. Ratcliffe, Water Pollution Laws: Can They Be Cleaned Up?, 57 
TUL. L. REV. 1343, 1355 (1983). 
29. Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, 9 I.L.M. 45. 
30. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 321; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 1356–57. 
31. Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57, 11 I.L.M. 284. 
32. See Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 1356, 1358–59. 
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conventions were practically replaced by the 1992 Protocols which 
increased liability caps and raised the maximum amount payable by the 
fund.33 
The international scheme was endorsed by most countries, including 
many common law jurisdictions.34 But the United States, which 
participated in the international negotiations and signed the original 
conventions, has ratified neither, mainly because compensation under 
the international scheme—which would have been exclusive if 
adopted—was deemed too low.35 This is still the case today, following 
the enactment of the OPA. Although the bill authorized implementation 
of the two conventions, the Senate adamantly objected.36 So the OPA 
merely expresses 
the sense of the Congress that it is in the best interests of the 
United States to participate in an international oil pollution 
liability and compensation regime that is at least as effective as 
Federal and State laws in preventing incidents and in 
guaranteeing full and prompt compensation for damages 
resulting from incidents.37 
The higher caps of the OPA, along with the likelihood of additional 
liability under state law, make ratification of these conventions by the 
United States practically impossible, because they cannot be “as 
effective as Federal and State law.”38 Because this Article purports to 
critically evaluate the structure of the American liability regime, a 
detailed analysis of the international system is excluded despite its 
outstanding global significance. 
Second, although this Article uses the Deepwater Horizon incident as 
a test case, it focuses only on pollution-related harm. The recent 
catastrophe in the Gulf of Mexico demonstrates other risks associated 
                                                      
33. See Jacobsson, supra note 28, at 378; Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages Under the 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 5 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 283, 288 (1993). 
34. See, e.g., Protection of the Sea (Civil Liability) Act 1981 (Cth) s 3–12 (Austl.); Protection of 
Sea (Oil Pollution Compensation Funds) Act 1993 (Cth) schs 1–3 (Austl.); Marine Liability Act, 
S.C. 2001, c. 6, §§ 47–105 (Can.); Liability for Oil Pollution Damages Act, 2004, SH No. 274 (Isr.); 
Merchant Shipping Act, 1995, c. 21, §§ 152–82 (U.K.). 
35. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 323, 326; Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The 
Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1, 1 (1990). 
36. See ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK 16–17 (1991). 
37. Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 3001, 104 Stat. 507–08 (1990). 
38. See George J. Mitchell, Preservation of State and Federal Authority Under the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990, 21 ENVTL. L. 237, 240–45 (1991); Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 24; Steven R. 
Swanson, OPA 90 + 10: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 After Ten Years, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 135, 
140 (2001). 
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with oil production and transportation, particularly the risk of personal 
injury and death. Eleven employees lost their lives following the 
explosion and seventeen were injured. These consequences are governed 
by federal legislation and, to some extent, by general maritime law. The 
Jones Act establishes a cause of action for negligence against an 
employer for an injury or death caused to a seaman in the course of 
employment.39 To qualify as a seaman, an employee’s duties must 
“contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its 
mission,” and he or she must have “a connection to a vessel in 
navigation . . . that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its 
nature.”40 Mobile drilling rigs, such as the Deepwater Horizon, have 
long been considered vessels for the purposes of the Jones Act.41 So at 
least some of the surviving victims of the explosion, along with relatives 
of the deceased, may have a cause of action under this Act. Non-fatal 
injuries might also be recoverable under general maritime law,42 while 
fatalities are also covered by the Death on the High Seas Act 
(DOHSA).43 Marine employees who do not qualify as seamen may 
recover from their employers under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act (LHWCA),44 which Congress extended to injuries 
occurring as the result of operations conducted on the outer continental 
shelf.45 The importance of liability for physical injuries is undisputed, 
                                                      
39. 46 U.S.C. § 30104 (2006 & Supp. 2009); Gillespie v. U.S. Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154 
(1964) (“[T]he Act gave recovery only for negligence.”). The Jones Act limits recovery to 
pecuniary loss. See Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990). 
40. Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis, 515 U.S. 347, 368 (1995) (alteration in original) (quoting McDermott 
Int’l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41. See, e.g., Producers Drilling Co. v. Gray, 361 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding that the 
Jones Act covers barges designed to serve as mobile drilling platforms); Offshore Co. v. Robison, 
266 F.2d 769, 779–80 (5th Cir. 1959) (same). 
42. See, e.g., Gosnell v. Sea-Land Service, Inc., 782 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Jones Act 
negligence and unseaworthiness [under general maritime law] are two separate and distinct 
claims.”).  
43. 46 U.S.C. § 30302 (2006). This Act preempts any action for wrongful death under general 
maritime law. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624–25 (1978). It coexists with the 
Jones Act in cases of wrongful death of seamen on the high seas. Heath v. Am. Sail Training Ass’n, 
644 F. Supp. 1459, 1467 (D.R.I. 1986). But the Jones Act also applies to non-fatal injuries on the 
high seas and to wrongful death not on the high seas. DOHSA also limits recovery to pecuniary 
losses. 46 U.S.C. § 30303. 
44. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2006). 
45. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (2006). Seamen cannot recover under the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 902(3)(G) (2006), so the LHWCA and the Jones Act are mutually exclusive. Chandris, 515 U.S. 
at 355–56. An employer’s liability under the LHWCA is exclusive, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (2006), and 
therefore precludes liability under general maritime law and the DOHSA. Stansbury v. Sikorski 
Aircraft, 681 F.2d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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but a critical appraisal of civil liability for oil pollution should not be 
eclipsed by a painstaking discussion of the law applicable to accidental 
losses not related to the pollution itself. 
Third, this Article acknowledges the likelihood of civil and criminal 
fines for oil pollution, and the interrelation between the severity of these 
sanctions and the extent of civil liability for the same conduct. For 
instance, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)46 provides 
that the owner and operator of any vessel or facility from which oil is 
discharged into or upon the navigable waters of the United States, 
adjoining shorelines, or the waters of the contiguous zone, shall be 
subject to a civil penalty in an amount up to $25,000 per day of violation 
or $1000 per barrel of oil discharged.47 Criminal and civil fines may then 
be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a punitive damages 
award.48 However, this Article focuses on civil liability, and therefore 
does not provide a comprehensive analysis of relevant criminal and civil 
penalties. 
I. LIABILITY IN THE PRE-OPA ERA 
This Part discusses pre-OPA law applicable to marine oil spills, using 
the Exxon Valdez incident as a test case. Part I.A focuses on general 
maritime law. Part I.A.1 shows that relational economic losses are 
generally irrecoverable under general maritime law and reviews the 
main justifications for the exclusionary rule. While Exxon was found 
liable for the lost catch of commercial fishermen and Alaska Natives 
under an established exception to the exclusionary rule, the court 
rejected all other claims for relational losses ensuing from the spill. Part 
I.A.2 explains the concept of punitive damages and its dominant 
justifications and discusses the chronicles of the punitive award in the 
Exxon Valdez litigation. Part I.B reviews pre-OPA federal legislation 
pertaining to civil liability for oil pollution, such as the Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline Authorization Act. Part I.C discusses relevant state legislation, 
such as the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act, which was invoked 
by the claimants in the Exxon Valdez litigation. 
                                                      
46. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
47. Id. § 1321(b)(3), (b)(7)(A). 
48. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1991). 
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A. General Maritime Law 
1. Purely Economic Losses 
a. The Exclusionary Rule 
Aquatic pollution may have harsh and widespread repercussions. In 
addition to harm to wildlife and natural resources,49 property damage,50 
and possibly bodily injuries, various economic losses may ensue. 
Commercial fishermen, oystermen, crabbers, and the like may lose their 
livelihood. Customers of these fishermen, such as seafood restaurants, 
retail shops, or canned food manufacturers, may incur additional 
expenses or even shut down temporarily, and suppliers of services and 
goods to the local fishing industry may lose profit. Owners of shoreline 
hotels, resorts, recreational areas, and other tourist-based businesses may 
suffer economic loss. Owners and charterers of ships unable to sail 
across the area of the spill, as well as owners of cargo delayed by the 
obstacle, may also incur loss. Those involved in the real estate industry 
in coastal states, such as builders, real estate agents, bankers, and 
lawyers, may face a decline in business. Suppliers, customers, 
employees, and relatives of any of the above may lose profits or incur 
unanticipated expenses. 
These economic losses may be classified as relational losses. A 
relational economic loss is a loss of profits or an expense that stems 
from physical injury to the person or property of a third party or to an 
ownerless resource.51 Starting with Anthony v. Slaid,52 and with very few 
deviations, American courts have consistently denied recovery for this 
kind of loss.53 The leading authority for the exclusionary rule is Robins 
                                                      
49. The state may recover for this harm as a trustee of the public. See, e.g., Maine v. M/V 
Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1099–1102 (D. Me. 1973); Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. 
Supp. 1060, 1066–67 (D. Md. 1972); California v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 929 (C.D. 
Cal. 1969); see also Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670–72 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(upholding a statute allowing a state agency to recover). 
50. These are generally recoverable. See, e.g., Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 257 (9th 
Cir. 1973); Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225, 226–28 (E.D.N.Y. 1953). 
51. See Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1574. 
52. 52 Mass. 290, 291 (1846) (holding that an extra expense incurred following a personal injury 
to a third party was “too remote and indirect”). 
53. See also Ins. Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 758–59 (1877) (holding that an insurance company 
cannot recover an amount paid under a life insurance policy following the intentional killing of the 
insured by the defendant because the loss was too remote); Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. & New 
Haven R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 274, 276–77 (1856) (same). 
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Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint,54 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that “a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the 
tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under 
a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong.”55 
Notwithstanding its explicit reference to a contractual relationship 
between the plaintiff and the immediate victim of the wrong, and to the 
defendant’s unawareness of such relationship, this case was broadly 
interpreted to exclude liability for any relational economic loss, whether 
the relationship between the two victims was contractual or 
noncontractual,56 known or unknown to the doer of the wrong.57 Further 
attempts to restrict the court’s ruling to lost profits as opposed to 
positive outlays,58 to negligence as opposed to other forms of action 
(e.g., nuisance),59 or to maritime law as opposed to land-based common 
law,60 have also failed. 
Federal courts have generally accepted the broad interpretation of 
Robins Dry Dock and have applied it to the great majority of relational 
loss cases.61 Only a few narrow exceptions have been recognized.62 Most 
                                                      
54. 275 U.S. 303 (1927). 
55. Id. at 309. For further discussion of this case, see Henry D. Gabriel, Testbank: The Fifth 
Circuit Reaffirms the Bright Line Rule of Robins Dry Dock and Fails to Devise a Test to Allow 
Recovery for Pure Economic Damages, 31 LOY. L. REV. 265, 267–71 (1985); Victor P. Goldberg, 
Recovery for Pure Economic Loss in Tort: Another Look at Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 20 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 249 (1991); David R. Owen, Recovery for Economic Loss Under U.S. Maritime Law: Sixty 
Years Under Robins Dry Dock, 18 J. MAR. L. & COM. 157 (1987). 
56. See, e.g., Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 625 (1st Cir. 1994); Barber 
Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51 (1st Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V 
Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021, 1023–24 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Oriental Republic Uru., 821 F. Supp. 
950, 954 (D. Del. 1993); In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 677 (E.D. Mich. 1992). 
57. See, e.g., Steele v. J & S Metals, Inc., 335 A.2d 629, 630 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974); PPG 
Indus., Inc. v. Bean Dredging, 447 So. 2d 1058, 1060–61 (La. 1984); Ferguson v. Green Island 
Contracting Corp., 355 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974). 
58. See, e.g., Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 51–52; In re Cleveland Tankers, 791 F. Supp. at 677. 
59. See, e.g., Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 56–57; Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1030–31; Dick Meyers 
Towing Serv. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1025 n.4 (5th Cir. 1978); Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 
A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. 1945). 
60. See, e.g., Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 627–28; In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 
697, 703 (D.N.J. 1995). 
61. See, e.g., Taira Lynn Marine Ltd. No. 5 v. Jays Seafood, Inc., 444 F.3d 371, 377–81 (5th Cir. 
2006); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. M/T Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829, 832–33 (3d Cir. 1985); Barber Lines, 
764 F.2d at 51–52; Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1021–28; Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d 
1201, 1202 (11th Cir. 1983); Akron Corp. v. M/T Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 152–53 (5th Cir. 1983); 
Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 34, 35 (11th Cir. 1982); Marine Navigation Sulphur 
Carriers v. Lone Star Indus., Inc., 638 F.2d 700, 702 (4th Cir. 1981); Cargill, Inc. v. Offshore 
Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212, 213–14 (5th Cir. 1980); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. M/V Bayou 
LaCombe, 597 F.2d 469, 472–74 (5th Cir. 1979); Dick Meyers Towing Serv., 577 F.2d at 1024–25; 
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Marshland Dredging Co., 455 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1972). 
021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete) 21/02/2011  11:09 
12 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1 
 
state courts have also embraced the bright-line rule.63 Only a few courts 
have replaced it with a more generous approach. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, for example, held that one owes a duty of care to take 
reasonable measures to avoid the risk of causing purely economic loss to 
particular individuals or individuals comprising an identifiable class with 
respect to whom one knows or has reason to know are likely to suffer 
such loss from one’s conduct.64 Still, the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
explicitly endorsed the majority view.65 
The exclusionary rule is an exception to the general principle that one 
whose unreasonable conduct caused foreseeable harm to another is liable 
for that harm.66 Overriding a general principle requires defensible 
reasons; if these reasons cease to exist, the exception must be set aside 
and the general principle should be reinstated. 
Some of the common justifications for denying liability for relational 
economic losses turn on the fear of open-endedness. In Ultramares 
Corp. v. Touche,67 Justice Cardozo observed that allowing claims for 
purely economic loss may expose the wrongdoer to “liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate 
class.”68 Although Ultramares was not a relational loss case, the same 
rationale has been invoked in numerous relational loss cases as the 
principal reason for exclusion of liability.69 The validity of this argument 
rests on two assumptions: a real likelihood of open-endedness and its 
undesirability. 
The soundness of the first assumption, open-endedness, seems self-
evident. A negligent infliction of personal injury may result in economic 
                                                      
62. See Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1613–17. 
63. See, e.g., Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. N.Y. & New Haven R.R., 25 Conn. 265, 275 (1856); 
Koskela v. Martin, 414 N.E.2d 1148, 1151 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); Gosch v. Juelfs, 701 N.W.2d 90, 91 
(Iowa 2005); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 
(N.Y. 2001); Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 501 A.2d 277, 278–79 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
64. People Express Airlines v. Consol. Rail Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 116 (N.J. 1985); see also 
Mattingly v. Sheldon Jackson Coll., 743 P.2d 356, 359–61 (Alaska 1987). 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979) (“One is not liable to another for 
pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other.”). 
66. See Bernstein, supra note 24. 
67. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931). 
68. Id. at 444. 
69. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); In re 
Waterstand Marine, Ltd., No. 87-1516, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3242, at *12–13 (E.D. Pa. 1988); 
Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979–80 (E.D. Va. 1981); Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 
419, 420 (Ga. 1903). Stapleton observes that the concern with indeterminate liability is one of the 
three crude ideas used to rationalize the exclusionary rule. Jane Stapleton, Comparative Economic 
Loss: Lessons from Case-Law-Focused “Middle Theory,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 531, 536 (2002). 
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loss to the victim’s relatives, customers, creditors, suppliers, employers, 
and partners; the loss of each of those may economically affect others, 
and so on. Similarly, injuring a factory may cause economic loss to its 
suppliers, distributors, consumers, business partners, and employees; 
owners of businesses where employees customarily shop may lose 
profits; and so forth. Theoretically, such proliferation of economic losses 
is boundless, so the potential number of relational victims is vast and 
indeterminate. This phenomenon may be termed “the ripple effect.”70 
The larger the number of valid claims, the more extensive the liability; 
and if the potential number of victims is large and uncertain, potential 
liability is also large and uncertain. I have conceded elsewhere that the 
assumption of open-endedness may be unsound in certain types of 
cases.71 In some fact situations the number of potential victims is limited 
and reasonably foreseeable.72 Moreover, a multiplicity of victims does 
not necessarily yield multiple actions and extensive liability, because not 
all victims sue73 and not all claimants recover.74 However, these 
reservations do not apply to catastrophic oil spills, where the number of 
victims is not only uncertain ex ante but potentially enormous, where 
procedural mechanisms reduce per capita cost of litigation thereby 
inducing victims to sue, and where the defendant may be a deep-
pocketed corporation. 
Regarding the second assumption, undesirability, three aspects of the 
“ripple effect”75 should be distinguished: the number of victims, the 
extent of liability, and uncertainty about both. The potential number of 
victims (the first aspect of the ripple effect) may in itself have some 
normative significance. For example, denial of liability in cases of 
multiple victims may be an efficient way to secure ex post loss 
spreading.76 Furthermore, allowing numerous relational victims to 
                                                      
70. See, e.g., Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 302 (Can.) (La 
Forest, J., dissenting); Jane Stapleton, Duty of Care and Economic Loss: A Wider Agenda, 107 LAW 
Q. REV. 249, 266, 285 (1991). 
71. See Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1600–01. 
72. See Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by Negligence: A 
Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 55–57 (1972). 
73. Cf. John Summers, Comment, The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic 
Analysis, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 145, 145, 150 (1983) (discussing cases where the injurer is insolvent or 
it is too costly for the victim to bring an action against the injurer). 
74. See Gabriel, supra note 55, at 266, 282 (explaining that the ordinary principles of tort 
liability, such as proximate cause, serve as rough screening devices). 
75. See supra note 70. 
76. See Robert Hayes, The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic Loss, 12 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 79, 114 (1979); Ronen Perry, Relational Economic Loss: An Integrated Economic Justification 
for the Exclusionary Rule, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 711, 761–63 (2004) [hereinafter Perry, Relational 
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recover may open the door to a mass of litigation which might 
overwhelm the courts,77 although this problem may be solved at least in 
part through procedural mechanisms such as consolidation of actions or 
class actions in appropriate cases.78 
At any rate, the relevance of the potential number of claimants largely 
depends on the rough correlation between the number of valid claims 
and the extent of tort liability (the second aspect of the ripple effect). 
The likelihood of extensive liability is deemed normatively relevant for 
several reasons. First, from a retributive justice perspective, allowing 
recovery for relational losses may give rise to an extreme disproportion 
between the severity of the sanction and the gravity of the wrong.79 An 
insignificant and perhaps absentminded deviation from the objective 
standard of care cannot justify the imposition of such an onerous 
penalty.80 Second, the marginal deterrent effect of tort liability may 
diminish to zero, because at a certain point no further precautions are 
available or because the expected payment is limited by defendants’ 
financial capacity or statutory caps.81 Allowing recovery where the 
marginal benefit in terms of deterrence is smaller than the administrative 
cost involved is economically wrong. In other cases, the fear of 
unconstrained liability may unduly restrict potential tortfeasors’ freedom 
                                                      
Economic Loss]; Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 738 (2006). 
77. Dundee Cement Co. v. Chem. Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1172–73 (7th Cir. 1983); Stevenson 
v. E. Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Caltex Oil (Austl.) Pty v Dredge 
“Willemstad” (1976) 136 CLR 529, 562–63 (Austl.) (Stephen, J., concurring); Bow Valley Husky 
(Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (1997), 153 D.L.R. 4th 385, 404 (Can.); John G. 
Rich, Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage—J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 1980 
UTAH L. REV. 431, 434; Ann O’Brien, Note, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood 
of Litigation for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 966 (1989). 
78. Caltex Oil (1976) 136 CLR at 606 (Murphy, J., concurring); Christopher V. Panoff, Note, In 
re the Exxon Valdez, Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp.: Cultural Resources, Subsistence Living, 
and the Special Injury Rule, 28 ENVTL. L. 701, 711–12 (1998). 
79. See, e.g., Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 501 A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985); Phoenix 
Prof’l Hockey Club, Inc. v. Hirmer, 502 P.2d 164, 165 (Ariz. 1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 766C cmt. a (1979); Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic 
Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1513, 1534, 1538 (1985) (asserting that abhorrence of 
disproportionate penalties for wrongful behavior is the most plausible explanation for judicial 
reluctance to allow recovery for pure economic loss); see also Gabriel, supra note 55, at 266; 
Hayes, supra note 76, at 82; O’Brien, supra note 77, at 967; Rich, supra note 77, at 434. 
80. But cf. Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty: Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of 
Economic Loss, 88 VA. L. REV. 1921, 1931–32 (2002) (criticizing this type of argument). 
81. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985); Donald Harris 
& Cento Veljanovski, Liability for Economic Loss in Tort, in THE LAW OF TORT: POLICIES AND 
TRENDS IN LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC LOSS 45, 53 (Michael Furmston 
ed., 1986). 
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of action and hinder socially beneficial initiatives and activities.82 Third, 
from an ex post perspective, unconstrained liability may be “crushing.”83 
Businesses whose activities are generally beneficial might be 
overburdened, their operation might be impaired, and some may even 
collapse. Fourth, as the extent of potential liability grows, insurance 
companies may refuse to cover liability, demand an unreasonable 
premium, or set an upper limit for the cover, thwarting loss spreading. 
Fifth, if potential liability is truly very large, potential injurers’ 
motivation to purchase liability insurance—where available—shrivels 
and losses are not spread.84 Sixth, from an interest-hierarchy distributive 
perspective, assuming that any defendant has a limited pool of assets that 
all successful claimants ultimately need to share, denial of liability for 
relational losses may be required to guarantee full recovery for injuries 
to physical interests which may be considered more deserving of legal 
protection.85 This argument loses much of its force where the primary 
injury is to a tangible resource. Even if the superiority of life and bodily 
integrity is undisputed,86 a distinction between property damage and 
purely economic loss in terms of interest hierarchy is hard to justify.87 
Seventh, from a compensatory perspective, when defendants have 
limited funds, each victim may end up with compensation for a very 
small fraction of his or her loss, rendering the costly process futile.88 
                                                      
82. See Phoenix Prof’l Hockey Club, 502 P.2d at 165; Aikens, 501 A.2d at 279; Andrew W. 
McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A Return to Principles of Corrective Justice in Deciding Economic 
Loss Cases, 69 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1520 n.17 (1983); Roger B. Godwin, Negligent Interference with 
Economic Expectancy: The Case for Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664, 676–79 (1964); O’Brien, 
supra note 77, at 967–68; Rich, supra note 77, at 435. 
83. Dundee Cement Co. v. Chem. Labs., Inc., 712 F.2d 1166, 1171 (7th Cir. 1983); Leadfree 
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 711 F.2d 805, 808 (7th Cir. 1983); Bruce Feldthusen, Pure 
Economic Loss in the High Court of Australia: Reinventing the Square Wheel?, 8 TORT L. REV. 33, 
49 (2000). 
84. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 240 (1987) (showing that 
injurers whose assets are lower than the harm they may cause can be in a better position without 
insurance); Harris & Veljanovski, supra note 81, at 53 (noting that potential defendants may 
underinsure if they believe they are judgment-proof). 
85. Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 352–53, 355 (Can.) (La 
Forest, J., dissenting); Geistfeld, supra note 80, at 1933–35, 1937–38, 1943, 1950 (applying this 
argument to emotional and economic losses). 
86. See, e.g., Mark Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle that Safety 
Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 125 (2001) (observing that physical injury is 
more disruptive to the pursuit of one’s life plan than a loss of money). 
87. See Christopher Harvey, Economic Losses and Negligence—The Search for a Just Solution, 
50 CAN. BAR REV. 580, 584 n.22 (1972). 
88. Dominion Tape of Can., Ltd. v. L.R. McDonald & Sons, Ltd. (1971), 21 D.L.R. 3d 299, 300 
(Can.) (“[A] judgment pompously engrossed which cannot be executed for want of sufficient assets 
on the part of the judgment debtor [turns the trial] into a futile exercise.”). 
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The third aspect of the ripple effect is that the extent of potential 
liability—the number of potential victims and the particulars of 
individual harms—is uncertain, leaving potential injurers incapable of 
preparing for contingencies.89 Furthermore, first-party insurance is 
arguably a more efficient means of spreading losses than liability 
insurance associated with tort liability,90 and uncertainty related to the 
ripple effect augments the advantages of the former. While first-party 
insurance covers well defined injuries to the insured’s interests, liability 
insurance covers third parties’ losses, whose number and extent are 
unknown in advance.91 
A second set of justifications for the exclusionary rule concerns the 
proper level of deterrence, regardless of the fear of open-endedness. The 
conventional economic justification for Robins Dry Dock is that many 
financial losses—particularly relational losses—are not true social 
costs.92 According to economic theory, efficient deterrence requires 
internalization of the social cost of every inefficient act by the actor.93 In 
assessing social costs, it is important not to add private losses that reflect 
“wealth transfers,” namely diminution of personal wealth that generates 
corresponding gains to others.94 Such gains do not mitigate the private 
loss, but cancel it out in the calculation of the externalized social cost.95 
Internalization of private losses irrespective of the parallel gains may 
lead to over-deterrence. Arguably, many relational economic losses 
correspond to resulting economic gains. If the competitors of an 
interrupted business can easily increase their production during the 
interruption at no cost beyond normal production costs, their gain will 
offset the unfortunate business’ loss. The farther demand is from its 
peak, the smaller the market share of the interrupted business, and the 
shorter the interruption, the easier it is for the competitors to stand in for 
the unfortunate business without destabilizing market equilibrium. 
Because demand is seldom at its peak,96 economic loss caused by a 
                                                      
89. See ROBBY BERNSTEIN, ECONOMIC LOSS 200–01 (1993); FRANCIS TRINDADE & PETER 
CANE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 371–72 (3d ed. 1999); Stapleton, supra note 70, at 543–
44. 
90. See infra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
91. See Posner, supra note 76, at 737–38. 
92. See W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1982). 
93. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, 
and Internalization, 79 OR. L. REV. 1, 16 (2000). 
94. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 4–7; Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 733. 
95. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 4; Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 733. 
96. See Posner, supra note 76, at 737. 
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temporary disturbance to production in a single business significantly 
exceeds the social cost in most cases.97 Moreover, consumers and 
producers can use inventories to meet demand during the interruption 
and, under these circumstances, profits are postponed or shifted with no 
significant social cost. To conclude, exclusion of liability for relational 
losses prevents internalization of private losses that do not reflect a true 
social cost.98 
Another deterrence-based justification turns on the fact that the 
injurer is already liable for the physical injury. The marginal deterrent 
effect obtained from holding the injurer liable for a relational loss may 
be nil whenever the cost of taking optimal care is lower than the ensuing 
reduction in expected liability for physical injuries.99 Alternatively, the 
marginal deterrent effect of a relational claim may be lower than the 
administrative cost involved in shifting the additional loss.100 So even if 
all relational losses were true social costs, allowing recovery might not 
be cost-justified. 
A third set of justifications for the exclusionary rule focuses on 
plaintiffs’ ability to protect themselves. Traditionally, courts viewed 
contract law as the appropriate venue for economic loss claims.101 
However, this perception has taken varying forms in different contexts. 
For example, a common argument in shoddy products cases was that 
allowing the buyer or the user to sue the seller or the producer in tort 
might undermine or circumvent the contractual allocation of risk.102 In 
                                                      
97. Considerable social costs may occur once in a while. But identifying these rare cases and 
trying to evaluate the respective social costs is not worthwhile. The cost of gathering and processing 
the necessary information is significantly higher than the social cost that would consequently be 
internalized. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 17. 
98. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 4. This view is now firmly established in the academic 
literature. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 251 (1987); SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 138–39; Feldthusen, supra note 83, at 50–51; 
Bruce Feldthusen & John Palmer, Economic Loss and the Supreme Court of Canada: An Economic 
Critique of Norsk Steamship and Bird Construction, 74 CAN. B. REV. 427, 436, 439 (1995); Victor 
P. Goldberg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 19–22, 31–32, 36–37 (1994); McThenia & Ulrich, supra note 82, at 1531; Posner, supra note 76, 
at 736–37. Stapleton observes that this is one of the three crude ideas used to rationalize the 
exclusionary rule. Stapleton, supra note 69, at 536–37. 
99. See Harris & Veljanovski, supra note 81, at 52–53. 
100. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 89, at 163; Bruce Feldthusen, Economic Loss in the Supreme 
Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow, 17 CAN. BUS. L. J. 356, 378–79 (1991); Posner, supra 
note 76, at 740; see also Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 301 
(Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting). 
101. See Stapleton, supra note 69, at 536, 551. 
102. E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 872–73 (1986) (“Contract 
law, and the law of warranty in particular, is well suited to commercial controversies of the sort 
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relational economic loss cases the abstract perception of the contract-tort 
interrelation has assumed a somewhat different form.103 Many judges 
and scholars contend that the typical relational victim could protect his 
or her interest through a contract with the primary victim and that failing 
to do so justifies exclusion of liability for several reasons.104 First, a 
victim who was aware of the financial risk and could easily protect 
against it, but refrained from doing so, arguably assumed the risk.105 
Second, where a potential victim enters a contract and agrees to bear a 
certain risk, the risk is usually priced into the contract, and the potential 
victim is thereby compensated ex ante for bearing it.106 Non-pricing of 
the risk indicates that it was deemed insignificant by the parties and, as 
such, not worthy of the tort system’s attention. Third, tort litigation is 
wearisome and costly, so if one can protect one’s interest more simply 
and cheaply, one should be encouraged to do so. Fourth, consensual 
transactions are generally preferable to collective intervention. A 
possible response to this line of argument is that protection through 
contract is frequently impractical due to asymmetric bargaining 
power,107 lack of information about potential risks,108 the prohibitive cost 
of negotiating contractual provisions for every contingency,109 or the 
absence of any contractual link between the plaintiff and the primary 
victim. 
A more sophisticated version of the same argument is that where an 
injury to a certain person or to a person’s property may result in 
economic losses to others, and where transaction costs are low, the law 
seeks to “channel” economic losses through the primary victim to save 
the cost of multiple tort actions.110 A channeling contract is a contractual 
arrangement whereby the primary victim agrees to indemnify relational 
                                                      
involved in this case because the parties may set the terms of their own agreements . . . Since a 
commercial situation generally does not involve large disparities in bargaining power . . . we see no 
reason to intrude into the parties’ allocation of the risk.” (citation omitted)). 
103. See Stapleton, supra note 69, at 551–54. 
104. See, e.g., Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); John G. 
Fleming, Tort in a Contractual Matrix, 3 TORT L. REV. 12, 18–19 (1995). 
105. See David Howarth, Economic Loss in England: The Search for Coherence, in CIVIL 
LIABILITY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS 27, 48 (Efstathios K. Banakas ed., 1996). 
106. But see Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 374 (Can.). 
107. Id. at 351 (La Forest, J., dissenting); id. at 374. 
108. Id. at 351 (La Forest, J., dissenting). 
109. See William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and Justice in Tort Damages: The 
Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 347, 366 (1986). 
110. Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 283 
(1982). 
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victims for their losses.111 Channeling saves the costs of litigating 
independent relational loss claims and may thus be economically 
desirable.112 According to this argument, the law encourages channeling 
by denying recovery for relational losses and allowing recovery for 
economic losses that have been shifted to the primary victim.113 I have 
shown elsewhere why this argument is unpersuasive.114 More 
importantly, the argument does not apply to economic losses caused by 
oil pollution, because oceanic resources have no owner with whom 
potential victims can negotiate channeling provisions. 
A related justification for the exclusionary rule derives from the 
notion of loss-spreading. The underlying assumption is that first-party 
insurance is a more efficient means of spreading relational losses than 
liability insurance associated with tort liability.115 The cost of 
information required for evaluating the risk is usually lower in the case 
of first-party insurance, because there is no need to assess third parties’ 
expected losses. The costs of establishing the right for compensation are 
also lower, because first-party insurance does not hinge on tort litigation 
or tort negotiation. Exclusion of liability induces potential victims to 
insure themselves against prospective personal losses, and potential 
injurers not to insure themselves against liability for these losses. It 
thereby guarantees efficient loss spreading while preventing double 
insurance.116 




114. Perry, The Economic Bias, supra note 20, at 1601–04. I will not provide a full explanation 
here, so as not to be repetitive. Generally, the channeling theory “is valid only if four conditions are 
met: (1) allowing recovery for the shifted loss is in itself warranted, (2) the costs of negotiating 
channeling provisions are truly lower than the subsequent reduction in administrative costs, (3) the 
traditional legal dichotomy encourages potential victims to negotiate channeling arrangements that 
they would not otherwise consider, and (4) there is no better way to minimize administrative costs.” 
Id. at 1602. In The Economic Bias, I showed that in most cases, one or more of these conditions will 
not be met. 
115. Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 54 (1st Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel. 
Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1029 (5th Cir. 1985); Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. 
Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd. (1997), 153 D.L.R. 4th 385, 404 (Can.); Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk 
Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 350 (Can.) (La Forest, J., dissenting); Feldthusen & 
Palmer, supra note 98, at 437, 443–44; James, supra note 72, at 52–53; Michael MacGrath, The 
Recovery of Pure Economic Loss in Negligence—An Emerging Dichotomy, 5 OXFORD J. LEGAL 
STUD. 350, 375 (1985); O’Brien, supra note 77, at 968. 
116. Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th at 352, 354 (La Forest, J., dissenting); Feldthusen, 
supra note 83, at 48–49; James, supra note 72, at 54–55. Ambiguous liability formulas (such as 
“proximity”) frequently result in double insurance. 
021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete) 21/02/2011  11:09 
20 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1 
 
Another self-protection argument is that exclusion of liability for 
relational losses gives potential victims an incentive to take precautions 
to prevent harm117 and gives actual victims an incentive to mitigate 
damages by diverting means of production used in the interrupted 
activity to other lucrative uses.118 For example, to avoid loss in cases of 
accidental power failure, businesses can install stand-by systems ex ante, 
or they can try to make up for the loss by doing more work when the 
interruption ends.119 Similarly, where a towed barge sinks, the tugboat 
owners will not suffer economic loss if they use their vessel to haul 
another ship;120 and when a factory is damaged and closed for repairs, 
workers will not incur loss if they obtain alternative employment.121 A 
possible response is that the defenses of comparative negligence and 
mitigation of damages provide the necessary incentives.122 They do so at 
a somewhat higher administrative cost than exclusion of liability,123 but 
in a less arbitrary manner. 
Lastly, the exclusionary rule is said to provide a certain and easily 
applicable limitation on tort liability.124 As a “bright-line rule,”125 it 
enables potential injurers and victims to better prepare for 
contingencies,126 impels actual victims to avoid fruitless litigation, 
thereby saving its cost, and makes the administration of tort actions by 
the courts easier and less costly.127 A possible response is that justice is 
more important than certainty128—otherwise there would be no liability 
at all. Liability should be limited in a just and principled manner, not 
through arbitrary bright lines. A milder version of the argument is that 
                                                      
117. See Barber Lines, 764 F.2d at 55. 
118. See Hayes, supra note 76, at 114. 
119. Spartan Steel & Alloys, Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1972] 3 All E.R. 557, 563–64 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
120. See Bishop, supra note 92, at 23–24. 
121. See id. at 17–18. However, one may say that if workers of the damaged factory find 
alternative employment they displace other workers. See Mario J. Rizzo, The Economic Loss 
Problem: A Comment on Bishop, 2 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 197, 205 (1982). 
122. SHAVELL, supra note 84, at 144–46. 
123. Goldberg, supra note 98, at 17. 
124. Candlewood Navigation Corp. v. Mitsui OSK Lines, Ltd., [1985] 2 All E.R. 935, 945 (P.C.) 
(appeal taken from N.S.W.) (“[The rule draws] a definite and readily ascertainable line.”); Leigh & 
Sillavan, Ltd. v. Aliakmon Shipping Co., [1986] 2 All E.R. 145, 153–54 (H.L.) (Eng.) (“simple to 
understand and easy to apply”). 
125. See Gabriel, supra note 55, at 265. 
126. Can. Nat’l Ry. Co. v. Norsk Pac. S.S. Co. (1992), 91 D.L.R. 4th 289, 335 (Can.); O’Brien, 
supra note 77, at 967. 
127. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1028–29 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[The 
rule] operates as a rule of law and allows a court to adjudicate rather than manage.”). 
128. See Gabriel, supra note 55, at 278, 284. 
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certainty may be relevant but not decisive: it must be weighed against 
other relevant factors. A less certain set of rules may be warranted if it 
yields fairer or more efficient outcomes. It is thus highly doubtful that 
certainty can justify a blanket exclusion of recovery for all relational 
losses. 
b. The Commercial Fishermen’s Exception 
Relational economic losses are generally irrecoverable under Robins 
Dry Dock.129 This common law rule, when applied to marine pollution, 
has a single well-defined exception. Courts have consistently allowed 
commercial fishermen, oystermen, crabbers, etc., to recover for lost 
fishing profits following a tortious diminution of aquatic life. The 
exception originated in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,130 in the wake of the 
Santa Barbara oil spill of 1969.131 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the exclusionary rule,132 but relied on existing exceptions 
to conclude that precedent did not foreclose examination of commercial 
fishermen’s claims against the polluter on their merits.133 The court 
explained that the chief element in determining whether a defendant 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiff was the foreseeability of the risk, and 
that the defendants in this case undoubtedly realized that negligence on 
their part might result in a substantial oil spill that would diminish 
aquatic life and injure commercial fishermen.134 It opined that the direct 
causal link between the impact of escaping oil on aquatic life and 
plaintiffs’ losses, public disapproval of environmental harm, the policy 
of preventing such harm, and the fact that the oil company was the 
cheapest cost avoider, also pointed to the existence of a duty of care.135 
Yet the court took pains to emphasize that its holding “does not open the 
door to claims that may be asserted by those, other than commercial 
fishermen, whose economic or personal affairs were discommoded by 
the oil spill.”136 Thus, recovery for pollution-related economic harms is 
                                                      
129. See, e.g., Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1021, 1028–29. 
130. 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974). 
131. See ROBERT O. EASTON, BLACK TIDE: THE SANTA BARBARA OIL SPILL AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (1972). 
132. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 563–64. 
133. Id. at 565–68. 
134. Id. at 568–69. 
135. Id. at 569–70. 
136. Id. at 570. 
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strictly limited to commercial marine harvesters.137 Moreover, the 
exception does not apply to fishermen who engage in commercial 
fishing without licenses required by the state.138 
According to the prevailing view, the fishermen’s exception is based 
on unique environmental concerns.139 Several judges have even 
suggested that this is not a genuine exception because fishermen have a 
constructive “proprietary interest in fish in waters they normally 
harvest,” making their loss equivalent to property damage rather than 
purely economic.140 At any rate, this exception is well established. More 
than a decade after Oppen, the Fifth Circuit upheld the general rule of no 
recovery for purely economic losses consequent on marine pollution, but 
recognized an exception for commercial fishermen.141 
c. The Exxon Valdez Litigation 
Following the Exxon Valdez incident in 1989, over 200 lawsuits, 
involving more than 30,000 claims, were brought in federal and state 
courts.142 Exxon’s liability to commercial fishermen was undisputed.143 
In fact, Exxon undertook a voluntary claims program, ultimately paying 
out $303 million, principally to fishermen whose livelihoods were 
disrupted from 1989 through 1994.144 Moreover, 10,000 commercial 
fishermen were allowed to sue in federal court and subsequently 
                                                      
137. Other victims are not entitled to recover. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 
752 F.2d 1019, 1026–29 (5th Cir. 1985). 
138. See Blue Gulf Seafood, Inc. v. TransTexas Gas Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 732, 734–35 (S.D. 
Tex. 1998); Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 841 F. Supp. 783, 785–86 (S.D. Tex. 1993). The 
court in Union Oil made clear that the plaintiffs “lawfully and directly make use of a resource of the 
sea . . . in the ordinary course of their business,” implying that the exception does not apply to 
unlawful harvesting. Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570. 
139. See Channel Star Excursions, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 77 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(“Union Oil is limited to the environmental sphere; if it is under admiralty law, it can only be said to 
have carved out a unique exception to the Robins Dry Dock rule by placing a duty on oil drillers to 
fish and the marine ecosystem.”). 
140. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1027 n.10; Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. 
Va. 1981). This, of course, is a clear fiction. See McThenia & Ulrich, supra note 82, at 1525–28. 
141. Testbank, 752 F.2d at 1028–29; see also Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 861 
(C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that the exception was not affected by E. River S.S. Corp. v. 
Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986), which upheld the Robins Dry Dock rule in a products 
liability case); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (allowing fishermen’s 
cause of action under a theory of public nuisance); Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216, 
1223, 1227 (Fla. 2010) (allowing fishermen’s cause of action in negligence). 
142. See Goldberg, supra note 98, at 1. 
143. In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1511, 1518 (D. Alaska 1991); In re Exxon Valdez, 
No. A89-0095-V, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *21, *23 (D. Alaska Mar. 23, 1994). 
144. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1078 (D. Alaska 2004). 
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recovered $286.8 million in compensatory damages, based on the market 
value of the fish they would have caught but for the spill.145 Note, 
however, that even fishermen were allowed to recover only the value of 
their lost catch; they were denied recovery for the reduction in value of 
their fishing permits146 and for lost profits from other businesses.147 
Similarly, there was no dispute that Alaska Natives had a right to 
recover economic damages “flowing from loss of fishing resources,” and 
their claims for harvest damages were settled.148 Indeed, the fact that the 
U.S. Supreme Court allowed fishermen and Alaska Natives to recover 
punitive damages indicates that it implicitly acknowledged their standing 
to claim compensatory damages.149 
In contrast, other claims were generally rejected under the Robins Dry 
Dock doctrine. The district court dismissed, inter alia, claims by 
providers of goods (such as fishing gear), services (such as maintenance 
and repair of fishing boats), and accommodation to commercial 
fishermen;150 by businesses that relied on an uninterrupted supply of 
seafood by local fishermen, including fish tenderers,151 seafood 
wholesalers,152 seafood processors,153 taxidermists,154 and even the 
Cordova Air Service;155 and by businesses that relied on the commercial 
fishing industry as both consumers and suppliers, such as a business that 
produced fishing baits from salmon carcasses.156 The district court also 
rejected claims by employees of the above businesses, such as cannery 
workers,157 as well as providers of goods and services to these 
                                                      
145. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 480 (2008). 
146. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5995, at *2–5 (D. Alaska 
Mar. 23, 1994). 
147. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *23 (a fisherman may recover for lost fishing 
income, but not for lost income from distributing fishing gear). 
148. Alaska Native Class v. Exxon Corp., 104 F.3d 1196, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 1997). 
149. See John P. Jones, The Sky Has Not Fallen Yet on Punitive Damages in Admiralty Cases, 83 
TUL. L. REV. 1289, 1293 (2009). 
150. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *11–12, *17 (dismissing claims by suppliers 
of goods and services to commercial fishermen); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1511, 
1514 (D. Alaska 1991) (dismissing claims by fishing lodges). 
151. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *3–4 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 26, 1994); Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1511, 1514. 
152. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *3–4. 
153. Id. at *3–4; Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1514. 
154. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *16 (D. Alaska Dec. 
23, 1992); Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1514. 
155. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *16. 
156. Id. at *15. 
157. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *3–4. 
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businesses, including the Kodiak Electric Association, which suffered 
reduced power usage by seafood processors,158 and a company selling 
refrigeration systems to those associated with the fishing industry.159 
The court likewise dismissed claims related to the tourism and leisure 
industry, including loss of enjoyment claims by sport fishermen, 
photographers, and kayakers,160 and—more importantly—economic loss 
claims by guides for sport fishermen and nature lovers,161 boat 
charterers,162 and the like. Finally, district courts in Alaska and 
California dismissed more tenuous claims brought by scientists who 
allegedly lost income from scientific activities, research funding, future 
intellectual property, etc., and were unable to capture and sell sea otters 
to aquariums and zoos;163 the Old Harbor Native Corporation, which 
allegedly lost profit due to congressional disapproval of an exchange of 
Native Corporation lands for oil exploration rights in the Arctic National 
Wildlife Refuge following the oil spill;164 and California drivers, who 
had to pay higher prices for gasoline following the spill.165 
2. Punitive Damages 
a. The Punitive Damages Doctrine 
Punitive damages are sums awarded to tort claimants beyond their 
actual harm.166 The idea of non-compensatory damages was known in 
ancient legal systems,167 but the modern doctrine of punitive damages 
dates back to the mid-eighteenth century. Originating in England,168 the 
                                                      
158. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *15. 
159. Exxon Valdez, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *5–6, *16. 
160. In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (D. Alaska 1991). 
161. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *10–11. 
162. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1514. 
163. Exxon Valdez, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6009, at *12–14 (“[S]cientists are not fishermen and 
otters are not fish which may be lawfully taken and sold.”). 
164. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20556, at *5–7 (D. Alaska 
Mar. 23, 1994). 
165. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., No. CV-90-2184, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251, at *2 (D. Alaska 
July 27, 1990). The Ninth Circuit did not contest the ruling with regard to the maritime tort, and 
focused instead on the claim under TAPAA, discussed below. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 
805, 807–08 (9th Cir. 1992). 
166. See, e.g., Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive Damages: The Limits of Due 
Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 893 (1991). 
167. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages 
Awards: Reforming The Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1285–86 (1993). 
168. See Wilkes v. Wood, [1763] 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498–99 (C.P.) (“[A] jury have it in their 
power to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are designed not only as a 
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doctrine was soon imported to America.169 A fierce debate over the 
legitimacy of punitive damages erupted in the mid-nineteenth century 
between Simon Greenleaf and Theodore Sedgwick. Apart from a fierce 
controversy about the proper interpretation of the case law,170 Greenleaf 
advocated a clear distinction between private and public law,171 insisting 
that a plaintiff in tort could not be permitted to vindicate the state’s 
interests,172 whereas Sedgwick believed a division between the public 
and private interests was “entirely fanciful and imaginary.”173 The U.S. 
Supreme Court settled the dispute in Day v. Woodworth,174 holding that 
the jury in a tort action could inflict exemplary, punitive, or vindictive 
damages on the defendant based on the enormity of his wrong rather 
than the measure of the plaintiff’s harm. The Court opined that despite 
past controversy, “repeated judicial decisions for more than a century are 
to be received as the best exposition of what the law is . . . .”175 
Three points deserve mention. First, since 1818 it has been clear that 
punitive damages are available not only in land-based common law but 
also under general maritime law.176 Second, by the end of the nineteenth 
century, most jurisdictions allowed punitive damages awards not only 
against individuals but also against corporations. At that time there was 
still some controversy about the availability of the remedy against 
corporations liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.177 This 
                                                      
satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as a punishment.”); Huckle v. Money, [1763] 95 Eng. 
Rep. 768 , 769 (K.B.) (introducing the term “exemplary damages”). 
169. See Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 6, 6 (1784) (allowing “exemplary damages”); see also 
Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77, 77 (1791) (instructing the jury “not to estimate the damages 
[according to] actual loss; but to give damages for example’s sake.” (emphasis in original)). 
170. 2 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 276–87 n.2 (9th ed. 1863) 
(insisting that damages were always compensatory); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES 666 (3rd ed. 1858) (contending that courts permitted punitive damages in 
exceptional cases); Simon Greenleaf, The Rule of Damages in Actions Ex Delicto, 9 L. REP. 529, 
530–38 (1846–47) (insisting that damages were always compensatory). 
171. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1299. 
172. Greenleaf, supra note 170, at 529–30. 
173. SEDGWICK, supra note 170, at 671. 
174. 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851). 
175. Id.; see also Denver & Rio Grande Ry. v. Harris, 122 U.S. 597, 609–10 (1887) (“The right 
of the jury in some cases to award exemplary or punitive damages is no longer an open question in 
this court.”); McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424, 431 (1854). But cf. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382, 
397 (1872) (holding that punishment is “out of place, irregular, anomalous, exceptional, unjust, 
unscientific, not to say absurd and ridiculous, when classed among civil remedies” and that the idea 
of punitive damages “is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and an unhealthy excrescence, 
deforming the symmetry of the body of the law.”). 
176. The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558 (1818). 
177. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1295–97. 
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controversy remains unsettled.178 Third, while punitive damages were 
originally awarded in cases of malicious and mean-spirited conduct, the 
doctrine has been gradually expanded to cases of recklessness and even 
gross negligence.179 These three developments laid the foundations for 
the punitive damages award in the Exxon Valdez case. 
In the twentieth century, the punitive damages doctrine was somewhat 
restrained. In several states, the plaintiff was required to satisfy a higher 
standard of proof, such as “clear and convincing evidence,” to obtain 
punitive damages.180 Moreover, in many states, punitive damages were 
subject to a statutory cap.181 Finally, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary penalties on a 
tortfeasor.182 A punitive damages award is therefore subject to 
substantive due process review. 
How does a court determine if a punitive damages award is 
excessive? In BMW v. Gore,183 the United States Supreme Court held 
that in reviewing awards of punitive damages under the Due Process 
Clause, courts ought to consider three guideposts.184 The first is the 
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct.185 Factors 
relevant in determining the degree of reprehensibility include the type of 
harm caused, victims’ vulnerability, defendant’s intentional malice or 
reckless disregard for health and safety of others, repetitive misconduct, 
and defendant’s efforts to mitigate the harm caused.186 The second 
                                                      
178. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law off Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1, 63 (1982) (“[some courts] hold that an employer may be liable for punitive damages for 
wrongful acts committed by employees in the course of their employment . . . [Others] limit 
vicarious punitive damage liability to those situations where wrongful acts were committed or 
specifically authorized or ratified by a managerial agent, or were committed by an unfit employee 
who was recklessly employed or retained.”). 
179. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1305–07; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (punitive damages may be awarded for reckless indifference to the rights of 
others); Ellis, supra note 178, at 20. 
180. See Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward Effectuating the True 
Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 483 (1993). 
181. See id. 
182. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Cooper Indus., Inc. 
v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433–34 (2001); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 
U.S. 559, 562 (1996); see also TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55 
(1993). 
183. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
184. Id. at 575–85. 
185. Id. at 575–80. 
186. See In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1085–89 (9th Cir. 2007). 
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guidepost is the disparity between the plaintiff’s actual or potential harm 
and the punitive damages award.187 In State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,188 the Court held that a single-digit ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages was more likely to accord 
with due process;189 but it emphasized that greater ratios could be 
consistent with the Due Process Clause where “a particularly egregious 
act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.”190 The 
third guidepost is the difference between the punitive damages award 
and the civil or criminal penalties authorized or imposed in comparable 
cases.191 
One of the most fundamental principles in the modern law of torts is 
that damages should restore the victim to the pre-tort condition 
(restitutio in integrum).192 Punitive damages are non-compensatory by 
definition. So although the specific goals of the punitive damages 
doctrine are yet to be explored, it is clearly inconsistent with the 
fundamental remedial maxim.193 Just like the exclusionary rule, punitive 
damages are an exception that needs to be justified, and if its 
justifications cease to exist, the general principle must be reinstated. 
In the past it was very frequently said that the aim of punitive 
damages was “to punish and deter,”194 but this wording is somewhat 
misleading because punishment—as this word is currently understood—
is not a purpose but a mechanism. Punishment may be defined as 
                                                      
187. BMW, 517 U.S. at 580–83. 
188. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). 
189. Id. at 425. 
190. Id. (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 582). Perhaps TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 
U.S. 443 (1993), is the type of exceptional case envisioned by the State Farm Court: compensatory 
damages were $19,000, the defendant acted in a “malicious and fraudulent” manner, and punitive 
damages were set at $10 million. Id. at 462 
191. BMW, 517 U.S. at 583–85. 
192. See supra note 27. 
193. See, e.g., Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 469 n.216 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Tort law is tied to the goal of compensation (punitive damages being the notable 
exception) . . . .”). 
194. See, e.g., BMW, 517 U.S. at 568; Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 
U.S. 257, 275 (1989); Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1981); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). The same language was used in professional and academic 
literature. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); Howard A. Denemark, 
Seeking Greater Fairness When Awarding Multiple Plaintiffs Punitive Damages for a Single Act by 
a Defendant, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 931, 935–36 (2002); David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive 
Damages: A Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REV. 369, 372–73 (1965). This 
language was also used in jury instructions. See RONALD W. EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON 
DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS 98 (3d ed. 1993). 
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“imposing a sanction,”195 and may have various goals, such as 
retribution, deterrence, appeasement of the victim, incapacitation of the 
wrongdoer, and education.196 Saying that punitive damages are meant to 
punish is tautological. But the word “punish” has not been used in vain. 
Courts and scholars sometimes use the terms “punishment” and 
“retribution” interchangeably. Whenever courts say that punitive 
damages are supposed to “punish and deter,” they seem to suggest that 
punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterrence.197 Recent 
American case law and literature use this more accurate terminology.198 
Retribution may be defined as imposing a sanction that corresponds to 
individual moral desert.199 The wrongdoer deserves to be punished on 
account of her wrongful conduct, and ought to be punished fairly 
regardless of the consequences of her punishment.200 Retributive justice 
does not require that the sanction be identical to the wrong committed; it 
merely insists on proportionality between the severity of the sanction 
and the gravity of the wrong.201 
Again, awarding non-compensatory damages is inconsistent with the 
corrective structure of tort law. Therefore, punitive damages are awarded 
merely at the margins, where courts feel that a compensatory award is an 
extremely lenient sanction in relation to the gravity of the defendant’s 
                                                      
195. Cf. George P. Fletcher, The Place of Victims in the Theory of Retribution, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 51, 52 (1999). 
196. See id. (describing various purposes of punishment). 
197. See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 178, at 1, 4 (observing that the term “punishment” implies 
retribution); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages 
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 310 (1983) (same). 
198. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 474, 492 (2008); State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 
19 (1991); Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 356–
57 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and 
Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2081 (1998). 
199. See Fletcher, supra note 195, at 52 (1999) (“[B]y the use of the . . . term ‘retributive,’ I 
simply mean imposing punishment because it is deserved on the basis of having committed a 
crime.”). 
200. Retributive justice is therefore retrospective, in that it looks backward to the particular 
wrongdoing, not forward to the consequences of the sanction. 
201. See TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 13, 83–84, 92, 123, 138 (1999); Peter 
Cane, Retribution, Proportionality, and Moral Luck in Tort Law, in THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 141, 
143, 160–61 (Peter Cane & Jane Stapleton eds., 1998); Tony Honoré, The Morality of Tort Law—
Questions and Answers, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 73, 87 (David G. Owen 
ed., 1995); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1690 (1992); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 530–32 (1987). 
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conduct.202 In other cases, the discrepancy between the gravity of the 
wrong and the severity of the sanction is left untouched for the sake of 
corrective justice.203 As observed by the United States Supreme Court: 
It should be presumed a plaintiff has been made whole for her or 
his injuries by compensatory damages, so punitive damages 
should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability, after 
having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to 
warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve retribution 
or deterrence.204 
Now egregious conduct may give rise to various types of sanctions, 
both legal (criminal, administrative, civil, or disciplinary) and extra-legal 
(such as reputational harm). To avoid disproportion between the overall 
burden imposed on the defendant and the gravity of the wrong, these 
sanctions must be taken into account in deciding whether punitive 
damages may be awarded in a specific case, and in determining their 
amount. Some jurisdictions have barred punitive damages in a civil 
action following or pending criminal conviction for the same conduct.205 
However, the prevailing view in the United States is that criminal 
conviction does not bar punitive damages, although it should be taken 
into account in determining the extent of the award.206 
Deterrence is the second dominant justification for punitive 
damages.207 The additional sanction may serve to deter the specific 
defendant from repeating the wrong and others from committing similar 
wrongs.208 Two questions arise in this respect. First, what types of 
wrongfulness do punitive damages aim to deter? The simplistic answer, 
following the Benthamite tradition, conflates the end and the means. 
Deterrence is such an integral and distinctive feature of utilitarian and 
economic theories of law that a sanction must deter inefficient conduct. 
But American courts seem to have a somewhat different intuition. For 
                                                      
202. See, e.g., David Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359, 364 
(1998). 
203. Ronen Perry, The Role of Retributive Justice in the Common Law of Torts, 73 TENN. L. REV. 
177, 228 (2006). 
204. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003) (citing BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). 
205. See Walther & Plein, supra note 194, at 384. 
206. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 22 (1991); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 
F.3d 1215, 1226 (9th Cir. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979); 
Annotation, Assault: Criminal Liability as Barring or Mitigating Recovery of Punitive Damages, 98 
A.L.R. 3d 870 (1980). 
207. See supra notes 194–98 and accompanying text. 
208. See Ellis, supra note 178, at 3. 
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instance, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.209 
the U.S. Supreme Court opined that the deterrent function of punitive 
damages was not exclusively efficiency-oriented: “Citizens and 
legislators may rightly insist that they are willing to tolerate some loss in 
economic efficiency in order to deter what they consider morally 
offensive conduct, albeit cost-beneficial morally offensive conduct.”210 
The second question is why deterrence of unwarranted conduct 
requires extra-compensatory damages. After all, ordinary compensatory 
damages already serve to deter.211 Modern theorists have proposed three 
answers. First, compensatory damages are insufficient if the wrongdoer 
might escape liability for the wrongful conduct.212 Efficient deterrence 
entails internalization of the harm caused by wrongful conduct to the 
extent that such harm reflects true social cost. However, there is a series 
of factors—external to substantive tort law—that let many wrongdoers 
off scot-free. Punitive damages may be used to overcome problems of 
under-enforcement.213 Under this perception, total damages should be 
the actual harm multiplied by the reciprocal of the probability that the 
defendant will be found liable when she should be found liable; punitive 
damages would then consist of the excess of total damages over 
compensatory damages.214 Indeed, courts have deemed heavier punitive 
awards justifiable when wrongdoing is hard to detect (increasing 
chances of getting away with it),215 or when the harm and the 
corresponding compensatory award are small (providing low incentive 
to sue).216 Second, compensatory damages might not provide a sufficient 
incentive if the wrongdoer derives morally illicit gains—financial or 
non-financial—from the wrongful conduct.217 Third, compensatory 
                                                      
209. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
210. Id. at 439–40. 
211. See Ellis, supra note 178, at 7; Gary T. Schwartz, Deterrence and Punishment in the 
Common Law of Punitive Damages: A Comment, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 133, 137 (1982). 
212. See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 98, at 160–65, 184–85, 223–24; SHAVELL, supra 
note 84, at 148; A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 873–74 (1998); Sharkey, supra note 198, at 365–68; Sunstein et al., supra 
note 198, at 2075, 2082. 
213. See supra note 212. 
214. For further discussion of this rationale, see supra note 211. 
215. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 582 (1996). 
216. Id. 
217. See Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 223 (Ala. 1989) (“If the wrongful conduct 
was profitable to the defendant, the punitive damages should remove the profit and should be in 
excess of the profit, so that the defendant recognizes a loss.”); Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis 
of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 79, 79, 98 (1982) (“[P]unitive damages should be 
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damages might not suffice if some of the actual harm caused by 
wrongful conduct is legally non-compensable.218 I have critically 
assessed these arguments elsewhere.219 
b. The Exxon Valdez Litigation 
The United States Supreme Court ruling on punitive damages in the 
Exxon Valdez case arose from commercial fishermen’s and Alaska 
Natives’ actions against Exxon. The factual basis for the punitive 
damages award was simple. The Exxon Valdez captain, a relapsed 
alcoholic, had consumed enough alcohol to incapacitate a non-alcoholic 
shortly before boarding the vessel and inexplicably exited the bridge 
during a critical maneuver, leaving a tricky course correction to 
unlicensed subordinates.220 Although the captain’s superiors knew he 
had completed an alcohol treatment program, it was unclear whether 
they also knew about his relapse.221 On trial, the jury found Exxon 
reckless (hence potentially liable for punitive damages) under 
instructions providing that a corporation is responsible for the reckless 
acts of employees acting in a managerial capacity in the scope of their 
employment.222 Thereafter, in 1994, the jury awarded $287 million in 
compensatory damages to commercial fishermen (from which prior 
voluntary payments were deducted).223 The jury also awarded $5000 in 
punitive damages against the captain and $5 billion against Exxon.224 
For more than a decade the issue went back and forth between the 
district court and the court of appeals,225 until the latter remitted the 
                                                      
computed at a level that offsets the illicit pleasure of noncompliance or the exceptional costs of 
compliance that motivated the injurer.”). 
218. See Ellis, supra note 178, at 28. 
219. Perry, The Exxon Valdez, supra note 20, at 30–32. 
220. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 477–78 (2008). 
221. Id. at 476–77. 
222. Id. at 480. 
223. Id. at 480–81. 
224. Id. at 481. 
225. These are the relevant decisions in chronological order: In re Exxon Valdez, 1995 Am. Mar. 
Cases 1956 (D. Alaska 1995); In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1236, 1241, 1246 (9th Cir. 
2001); In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (D. Alaska 2002) (reducing the punitive 
award to $4 billion); Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 30-35166, 2003 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 18219, at *1–2 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003); In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110 
(D. Alaska 2004) (increasing the award to $4.5 billion). 
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punitive damages award to $2.5 billion.226 Exxon appealed to the United 
States Supreme Court. 
On its appeal, Exxon raised three arguments. Its first argument was 
that it was an error to instruct the jury that a corporation was responsible 
for the reckless acts of employees in a managerial capacity while acting 
in the scope of their employment.227 Put differently, a court cannot 
award punitive damages under maritime law against shipowners for 
actions by underlings not “directed,” “countenanced,” or “participated 
in” by the owners.228 The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued that 
maritime law should conform to land-based common law, in which 
punitive damages can be awarded against a principal because of an act 
by an agent where “the agent was employed in a managerial capacity 
and was acting in the scope of employment.”229 The Court was equally 
divided on this question, and therefore left the Ninth Circuit’s opinion 
undisturbed without setting a precedent on this matter.230 
Exxon’s second argument was that the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act (FWPCA)231 preempted the maritime law remedy of 
punitive damages.232 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
finding that there was no clear indication of congressional intent to 
occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, and that punitive damages 
for private harms would have no frustrating effect on the FWPCA’s 
remedial scheme.233 
Exxon’s last argument was that the $2.5 billion punitive damages 
award exceeded the bounds justified by the underlying goals of this 
remedy.234 The Court reiterated the view that punitive damages are 
aimed at retribution and deterrence, and limited to cases of “enormity,” 
in which a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, 
willful, wanton, and reckless indifference to others’ rights, or even more 
deplorable behavior.235 The Court observed that in recent decades the 
median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards had remained less than 
                                                      
226. Baker v. Exxon Mobile Corp., 490 F.3d 1066, 1073, 1095 (9th Cir. 2007); Baker v. Exxon 
Mobile Corp., 472 F.3d 600, 602, 625 (9th Cir. 2006). 
227. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 482 (2008). 
228. Id. at 483 (quoting The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546, 558–59 (1818)). 
229. Id. at 484. The rule is set forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 909(c) (1979). 
230. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484. 
231. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2006). 
232. Baker, 554 U.S. at 484–86. 
233. Id. at 488–89. 
234. Id. at 489–90. 
235. Id. at 492–93. 
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1:1, and that there has been no marked increase in the percentage of 
cases with punitive awards.236 It opined, however, that the 
unpredictability of high punitive awards was in tension with their 
punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an 
eccentrically high punitive verdict carries.237 A penalty should be 
reasonably predictable in its severity, to enable every person to know 
what the stakes are in choosing one course of action over another; and a 
penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a fair probability of 
suffering in like degree for like damage.238 The Court concluded that 
awards at or below the empirically established median would roughly 
express jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases like the case at bar, 
which have no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness (such as malice 
or avarice), and raise no unique obstacles to enforcement (such as a 
modest harm or low likelihood of detection). Accordingly, and given the 
need for predictability, the Court held that a 1:1 ratio was a fair upper 
limit in such maritime cases, therefore reducing the punitive damages 
award to $507.5 million.239 Cases in which the defendant’s conduct is 
more egregious than reckless are not so limited.240 
B. Federal Legislation 
Prior to the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act, oil spills were 
governed by a patchwork of federal legislation. Section 13 of the Rivers 
and Harbors Act of 1899241 provides that it is unlawful to discharge or 
cause a discharge of “any refuse matter of any kind” into any navigable 
water of the United States. Courts have consistently held, however, that 
this section does not confer a private cause of action on victims of 
discharge.242 The FWCPA provided recovery for government cleanup 
and restoration costs, but did not address private losses.243 Section 311 of 
this Act prohibits “[t]he discharge of oil or hazardous substances. . . in 
                                                      
236. Id. at 497–99. 
237. Id. at 500–03. 
238. Id. at 502–03. 
239. Id. at 512–15. 
240. See Jones, supra note 149, at 1302. 
241. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (2006). 
242. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1031 n.15 (5th Cir. 1985); 
Evansville v. Ky. Liquid Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008, 1011–12 (4th Cir. 1979); Yates v. Island 
Creek Coal Co., 485 F. Supp. 995, 996–97 (W.D. Va. 1980); Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 373 F. Supp. 
839, 844–45 (D. Me. 1974). 
243. See Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 327; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 1344–45. 
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such quantities as may be harmful” to U.S. controlled waters,244 and 
provides for administrative and civil penalties for various violations.245 
But this section also does not allow recovery for harm caused to private 
entities.246 
Three statutes addressed oil pollution liability and compensation, but 
only with regard to incidents related to specific ventures. The first was 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA),247 invoked by 
many claimants in the Exxon Valdez case. The Act imposed strict 
liability for damages resulting from marine pollutions, apparently 
without the Robins Dry Dock limit;248 yet its scope was very limited. 
First, it applied only to oil pollution, not to the release of other 
hazardous substances.249 Second, it only covered incidents related to the 
operation of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.250 Third, it granted a 
cause of action only against certain classes of polluters, namely owners 
and operators of vessels onto which oil transported through the Trans-
Alaska pipeline was loaded at the pipeline’s terminal facilities.251 
Finally, the TAPAA set rigid liability caps. In the case of a discharge 
from a vessel, liability could not exceed $100 million, of which the 
owner and operator of the vessel were liable for the first $14 million, and 
the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund was liable for the balance.252 
                                                      
244. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3) (2006). 
245. Id. § 1321(b)(6)–(7). 
246. See, e.g., Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014 (E.D. La. 
1993); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 982 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
247. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1656 (2006). 
248. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *13 (D. Alaska Dec. 
23, 1992); Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853, 858–60 (C.D. Cal. 1992); In re Exxon Valdez, 
767 F. Supp. 1509, 1515 (D. Alaska 1991); In re Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (D. Alaska 
1990). But cf. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., No. 90-2184, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13251, at *2–3 (C.D. 
Cal. July 27, 1990) (holding that Robins Dry Dock applies to claims under TAPAA). On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision without directly discussing the applicability of 
Robins Dry Dock. It held that plaintiffs’ losses were “remote and derivative” and fell “outside the 
zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect when it passed TAPAA.” Benefiel v. 
Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992); see also David P. Lewis, Note, The Limits of 
Liability: Can Alaska Oil Spill Victims Recover Pure Economic Loss?, 10 ALASKA L. REV. 87, 116–
30 (1993) (supporting the district court’s position). 
249. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1) (2006). 
250. Id. 
251. Id. 
252. Id. § 1653(c)(3). The pipeline operator “collect[s] from the owner of the oil . . . a fee of five 
cents per barrel,” and the collection ceases upon the accumulation of $100 million. Id. § 1653(c)(5). 
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Robins Dry Dock applied to any damages in excess of the $100 million 
recoverable under the TAPAA.253 
Similarly, the Deepwater Port Act (DPA) imposed strict but limited 
liability for removal costs and damages that resulted from a discharge of 
oil from deepwater ports or vessels proceeding to or from such ports.254 
The DPA also established a fund that was available for compensation in 
excess of the statutory cap, originally up to $100 million.255 Lastly, the 
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), as amended in 1978, 
applied to discharges from offshore facilities on the outer continental 
shelf and from vessels carrying oil from these facilities.256 The OCSLA 
imposed strict liability on the owner and operator of the offshore facility 
or the vessel, subject to statutory caps, and established the Offshore Oil 
Pollution Compensation Fund that covered losses not otherwise 
compensated up to $200 million. Although cases like the Deepwater 
Horizon, which occurred on the outer continental shelf, would have been 
governed by the OCSLA prior to 1990,257 the liability sections of this 
Act—like those of the DPA—were repealed by the Oil Pollution Act of 
1990.258 
C. State Law 
Apart from common law remedies, most coastal states and the five 
Great Lakes states have enacted water pollution legislation with strict 
liability provisions.259 The main question was whether oil pollution 
victims could pursue claims under state law, in particular where such 
claims did not conform to federal maritime law. 
For instance, in an attempt to circumvent the harsh implications of 
Robins Dry Dock in the Exxon Valdez case, many claims were brought 
under the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act,260 which imposes 
                                                      
253. Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. at 1515; see also Exxon Valdez, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, 
at *12–13. 
254. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1524 (2006); Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 328–29. 
255. This amount was reduced by the Deepwater Port Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
419, § 4(a), 98 Stat. 1607, 1608–09 (1984). 
256. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1811–1824 (2006); Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 329–30. 
257. “Outer Continental Shelf” includes “all submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the 
area of lands beneath navigable waters [under state jurisdiction], and of which the subsoil and 
seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.” 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1331(a) (2006). 
258. See Pub. L. No. 101-380, §§ 2003–2004, 8102 104 Stat. 507, §§ 2003–2004, 8102 (1990). 
259. See, e.g., Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 10–11. 
260. ALASKA STAT. § 46.03.822–.824 (2006). 
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strict liability for damages, including economic losses, caused by 
unauthorized release of hazardous substances. A controversy emerged 
regarding the possible preemption of this provision by general maritime 
law. Under Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,261 state legislation may 
incidentally affect maritime affairs, unless it “contravenes the essential 
purpose expressed by an act of Congress, or works material prejudice to 
the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with 
the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and 
interstate relations.”262 The federal district court in Alaska held that 
Robins Dry Dock applied to claims brought against Exxon under the Act, 
because state law may not conflict with federal maritime law.263 Other 
courts interpreting comparable legislation in other states in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, including the Fifth Circuit, reached similar 
conclusions.264 
However, both the Alaska Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit on 
appeal from the District Court of Alaska, decided that Robins Dry Dock 
did not preempt liability for purely economic loss under state law,265 and 
this seems to be the dominant view today.266 According to this stance, 
                                                      
261. 244 U.S. 205 (1917). 
262. Id. at 216; see also Askew v. Am. Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 339 (1973). 
263. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *5–7 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 26, 1994); In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *17–20 (D. 
Alaska Dec. 23, 1992); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1515–16 (D. Alaska 1991). More 
accurately, the district court held that Robins Dry Dock applied to claims under the Alaska Act 
against entities not liable under the TAPAA, and to claims against entities liable under the TAPAA 
in excess of the TAPAA cap. Because the vessel owner and operator are liable for only $14 million 
under the TAPAA, damages claimed against the vessel-interest-defendants in excess of $14 million 
were subject to Robins Dry Dock. In re Glacier Bay, 865 F. Supp. 629, 637 (D. Alaska 1991). 
264. See Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1021, 1031–32 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(“[F]ederal interest in protecting maritime commerce is often best served by the establishment of 
uniform rules of conduct . . . The Robins rule has proved to be a workable and useful tool in our 
maritime jurisprudence. To permit recovery here on state law grounds would undermine the 
principles we seek to preserve today.”). The Fifth Circuit reiterated this stance in a slightly different 
context in IMTT-Gretna v. Robert E. Lee S.S., 993 F.2d 1193, 1195 (5th Cir. 1993). See also In re 
Ballard Shipping Co., 810 F. Supp. 359, 364–66, 368–69 (D.R.I. 1993) (interpreting R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 46-12.3-4 (1991)); In re Oriental Republic Uru., 821 F. Supp. 950, 955–56 (D. Del. 1993) 
(discussing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6207 (1991)). 
265. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2001); Kodiak Island Borough v. 
Exxon Corp., 991 P.2d 757, 767–69 (Alaska 1999). 
266. See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 631 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that 
the Rhode Island Act is not preempted by the admiralty clause); Slaven v. BP Am., Inc., 786 F. 
Supp. 853, 864–65 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that state law claims that go beyond Robins are not 
preempted); cf. In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., Ltd., 900 F. Supp. 697, 702–05 (D.N.J. 1995) 
(holding that maritime law does not preempt New Jersey’s common law, which does not 
automatically deny recovery for purely economic loss). 
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Robins Dry Dock is not a “characteristic feature” of maritime law 
because it neither originated nor has exclusive application in maritime 
law.267 Moreover, to determine whether state law “interferes with the 
proper harmony and uniformity” of maritime law, a court needs to apply 
a balancing test that weighs state and federal interests on a case-by-case 
basis.268 The balance in this case tips in favor of the state: “Alaska’s 
strong interest in protecting its waters and providing remedies for 
damages resulting from oil spills outweighs the diminished federal 
interest in achieving interstate harmony through the uniform application 
of Robins.”269 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district 
court’s rulings on this issue, and remanded the case for reconsideration 
of several economic loss claims under Alaska law.270 Following this 
decision, Exxon apparently settled these claims.271 Still, as in the case of 
the TAPAA, recovery for economic losses hinged on the intricacies of a 
special legislative scheme. 
II. THE GENERAL PROBLEM: SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION 
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND THE PUNITIVE 
DAMAGES DOCTRINE 
This Part explains why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to 
incongruity on the justificatory level. Part II.A shows that simultaneous 
application of the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine 
pulls the limits of civil liability in opposing directions. Each seems to 
negate at least some of the warranted effects of the other, and applying 
the two in a single case futilely violates general principles of tort law 
and generates distributive injustice. Part II.B delineates the contours of 
the problem, showing that although it surfaced in a marine oil pollution 
setting, it is essentially a general weakness of maritime and land-based 
common law. Part II.C proposes a conceptual framework for resolution. 
The main idea is that where liability must be expanded beyond the limits 
set by the exclusionary rule to obtain certain levels of deterrence and 
retribution, relaxing the exclusionary rule and allowing more victims to 
recover is more defensible than awarding punitive damages to a very 
few successful claimants. 
                                                      
267. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1251; Kodiak, 991 P.2d at 767. 
268. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1251. 
269. Id. at 1252–53; Kodiak, 991 P.2d at 769. 
270. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1253. 
271. See, e.g., Sea Hawk Seafoods v. Exxon Corp., 484 F.3d 1098, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(noting that a claim brought by a seafood processor under Alaska law was settled). 
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A. The Adverse Consequences of Simultaneous Application 
Liability for purely economic loss and punitive damages were treated 
as distinct legal matters throughout the Exxon Valdez litigation, and this 
is indisputably correct from a purely doctrinal perspective. However, the 
two matters are interlinked on a deeper level. To understand the essence 
of the problem, let us assume first that the exclusionary rule sets a 
justifiable limit on liability. The main purpose of this rule is to address 
the specter of indeterminate and potentially enormous liability. The fear 
of overwhelming the court system with numerous claims proved 
exaggerated in the Exxon Valdez litigation, where the use of procedural 
methods, such as consolidation of actions, alleviated the judicial burden 
to a practicable level.272 Although the Court rejected many claims, 
thousands of claims were handled quite efficiently. Still, the likelihood 
of extensive liability, correlated with the prospect of numerous claims, is 
troubling for various reasons. Most importantly, extensive liability may 
give rise to an abominable disproportion between the severity of the 
sanction and the gravity of the wrong; unduly restrict the freedom of 
action of potential tortfeasors; crush productive businesses; and make 
liability insurance not worthwhile to insurers and potential injurers alike. 
However, if the exclusionary rule reduces liability to a normatively 
defensible level, an award of punitive damages necessarily increases the 
extent of liability beyond that level.273 And if in certain types of cases an 
expansion is justified, how can liability for economic loss still be denied 
on the grounds of the need to reduce liability? 
Two arguments relating to defendants’ limited funds require special 
attention. First, given the limited pool that all successful claimants 
ultimately need to share, liability for relational losses may prevent full 
recovery for injuries to physical interests, which may be more worthy of 
legal protection. Second, each victim may end up with compensation for 
a very small fraction of his or her loss, making the costly process futile. 
Both arguments assume that allowing recovery for economic losses 
would extend liability beyond the defendant’s capacity. But if the 
exclusionary rule sets the appropriate limit, an award of punitive 
damages generates a similar problem. Assume, for the sake of argument, 
that under the exclusionary rule liability perfectly matches the 
defendant’s capacity. In this case, an award of punitive damages to all 
                                                      
272. See, e.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479 (2008) (“The remaining civil 
cases were consolidated into this one against Exxon . . . .”). 
273. For example, if the exclusionary rule makes liability insurance more readily available, 
punitive damages (if covered by liability insurance) may reinstate the problem. 
021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete) 21/02/2011  11:09 
2011] DEEPWATER HORIZON AND CIVIL LIABILITY 39 
successful claimants will be futile and wasteful in terms of 
administrative costs, because it will not change the ultimate payment to 
each claimant. An award of punitive damages to some of the successful 
claimants will result in under-compensation of the others. 
Another aspect of the ripple effect of economic losses is that the 
extent of potential liability is uncertain, leaving potential injurers 
incapable of preparing for contingencies. The exclusionary rule is said to 
eliminate most of this uncertainty. Yet an award of punitive damages, 
subject only to general constitutional guideposts, reinstates a high degree 
of uncertainty into the system, as the U.S. Supreme Court in the Exxon 
Valdez case observed.274 Potential injurers cannot accurately predict the 
extent of compensatory damages, which serve as a benchmark for 
punitive damages, or the ultimate ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages. The 1:1 ratio, which reduces uncertainty to 
some extent, applies only in maritime law, and even there it may be 
relaxed in certain circumstances. 
The conventional economic justification for Robins Dry Dock is that 
many financial losses are not true social costs. Thus, exclusion of 
liability prevents over-internalization, hence over-deterrence.275 But, 
again, if limiting liability is required to prevent over-deterrence, an 
award of punitive damages increases the extent of liability beyond the 
normatively defensible level. And if in certain types of cases an 
expansion is nonetheless justified, there is no reason to prefer a non-
compensatory sanction to compensation for actual losses. An economic 
theorist might argue that each of the two rules deals with a different 
problem: the exclusionary rule prevents internalization of private losses 
that do not correspond to social costs, and punitive damages are used to 
overcome problems of under-enforcement. These two problems entail 
independent modifications of the extent of liability, so the simultaneous 
application of the two rules is justified. Because this appears to be a 
general challenge to my thesis, I discuss it at length below. 
Another deterrence-based justification for the exclusionary rule turns 
on the fact that the injurer is already liable for the physical injury. The 
marginal deterrent effect obtained from holding the injurer liable for 
relational economic losses is said to be lower than the administrative 
cost involved in shifting the additional loss.276 In cases like the Exxon 
Valdez, liability for harm to natural resources, property damage, and 
                                                      
274. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 499–500, 502. 
275. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
276. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. 
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marine harvesters’ economic losses (under the fishermen’s exception), 
together with criminal fines, might provide sufficient deterrence. If so, 
awarding punitive damages may not be cost-justified. Although the cost 
of assessing punitive damages in a particular case is probably lower than 
the cost of handling additional claims, the administrative cost is still 
significant, as illustrated by the Exxon Valdez litigation,277 and may 
outweigh the benefit in terms of marginal deterrence. Again, if in certain 
cases an expansion of liability is necessary to achieve the twin goals of 
retribution and deterrence, the justification for denying recovery for 
economic losses no longer applies. 
Many contend that the typical relational victim could protect his or 
her interests through a contract with the primary victim, and that failing 
to do so justifies exclusion of liability. I have demonstrated the 
weaknesses of this argument elsewhere.278 In particular, protection 
through contract is frequently impractical. Marine pollution cases 
provide a clear example of impracticability, because oceanic resources 
have no owner with whom potential victims can bargain. So even if the 
contractual protection argument is valid in other contexts, it is generally 
irrelevant here. 
A related explanation for the exclusionary rule is the need to 
incentivize victims to take precautions and to mitigate damages. 
Admittedly, an award of punitive damages does not fully cancel out this 
benefit, because punitive damages can be awarded only to those who 
have a valid cause of action, and relational victims have none. However, 
incentivizing potential victims is a relatively weak and uncommon 
justification for the exclusionary rule, because the doctrines of 
comparative negligence and mitigation of damages can provide the 
necessary incentives. In any case, losses attributable to the victim’s 
imprudence, before or after the accident, are not social costs externalized 
by the injurer. So denying recovery for such losses not only provides an 
incentive to potential victims, but also prevents over-deterrence of 
potential injurers. Awarding punitive damages under these 
circumstances once again adds a deterrent beyond the warranted level. 
                                                      
277. First, the jury needed to consider whether Exxon was reckless, hence potentially liable for 
punitive damages. Baker, 554 U.S. at 479–80. Second, the jury had to determine the proper amount 
of punitive damages. Id. at 480. These steps have a price. Moreover, the two judgments may be 
challenged in appellate courts. In fact, the question of the proper amount in the Exxon Valdez case 
went back and forth between the district court and the court of appeals and was decided by the U.S. 
Supreme Court nearly fifteen years after the initial judgment. 
278. See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, the exclusionary rule is said to provide a certain and easily 
applicable limitation on tort liability. I have opined that liability should 
be limited in a just and principled manner, not through arbitrary bright 
lines.279 But even if simplicity were a valid justification for blanket 
exclusion of liability, the benefit would once again be counterbalanced 
by an award of punitive damages. The U.S. Supreme Court explained 
that the real problem with punitive damages is the stark unpredictability 
of the awards; while the median ratio of punitive to compensatory 
awards falls within a reasonable zone, the variance is quite high.280 
Although the Court set an upper limit to this ratio in cases of 
recklessness tried under maritime law, it left a relatively high degree of 
uncertainty in cases of more reprehensible conduct, as well as in land-
based common law. The common law, despite constitutional constraints, 
is incapable of eliminating the uncertainty associated with punitive 
damages. 
Now let us look at the other side of the coin. Punitive damages aim to 
increase liability to a normatively desirable degree. They are awarded 
where courts feel that a compensatory award is an extremely lenient 
sanction with regard to the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, or that an 
additional extra-compensatory sanction is required to secure the 
necessary level of deterrence. If compensation for actual harm is 
insufficient to obtain proper levels of retribution and deterrence, it seems 
odd that an extra-compensatory supplement intended to increase liability 
to a desirable level, namely punitive damages, is accompanied by a 
significant reduction in overall liability for actual harm through the 
exclusionary rule. If liability should exceed actual harm, denial of 
recovery for a substantial portion of the aggregate loss is 
counterintuitive, not to say absurd. 
In sum, if in a particular case there is good reason to set liability 
below actual harm, as the exclusionary rule does, liability should be 
limited, and the effects of such limitation should not be canceled out by 
a subsequent increase in overall liability. If, on the other hand, there is 
good reason to increase liability beyond actual harm, as the punitive 
damages doctrine does, liability should increase, and the effects of the 
expansion should not be alleviated by wholesale denial of recovery for 
some of the actual harm. But what if in the particular case there are 
legitimate reasons to reduce liability, along with equally legitimate 
reasons to expand liability? The question should then be whether—all 
                                                      
279. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
280. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497–500. 
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things considered—the scope of liability must equal, exceed, or be less 
than actual harm. In the absence of a specific reason to conclude 
otherwise, liability must equal actual harm. If liability must fall short of 
actual harm, a reasonable limitation of liability is warranted, while 
punitive damages are not. If liability must exceed actual harm, punitive 
damages are warranted and exclusion of liability for some of the 
provable loss is not. Either way, the exclusionary rule and the punitive 
damages doctrine should not be applied simultaneously. 
As implied above, one may argue that the exclusionary rule and the 
punitive damages doctrine are intended to solve separate and 
independent problems and entail incommensurable modifications in the 
scope of tort liability. Arguably, one set of justifications requires a 
certain reduction, while another requires an unequal expansion. Thus, 
the two rules should be allowed to apply simultaneously, each in 
accordance with its own rationale. A traditional economic version of this 
argument might be that the exclusionary rule prevents internalization of 
private losses that do not correspond to social costs,281 whereas the 
punitive damages doctrine addresses problems of under-enforcement.282 
For example, assume that a wrongful conduct causes a $1 million loss to 
private entities, of which $100,000 constitutes true social cost, and that 
the probability of escaping liability is 0.75. In accordance with the two-
layer approach the court should award compensatory damages to the 
extent of the social cost, namely $100,000, and subsequently award 
$300,000 in punitive damages ($100,000/0.25$100,000) to make up for 
cases of impunity. 
The answer is simple. The normatively desirable scope of liability 
always equals, exceeds, or is less than actual harm. If, considering the 
justifications of the exclusionary rule on the one hand, and those of 
punitive damages on the other, the court concludes that liability must be 
equal to or lower than actual harm, as in the foregoing example, 
awarding punitive damages while denying recovery for actual harm is 
implausible from conceptual and distributive justice perspectives. Both 
the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine are exceptions 
to general principles of private law. Victims of wrongful conduct should 
generally be allowed to recover for their losses, and every victim should 
be restored, as much as possible, to the pre-tort condition. If there is 
reason to limit liability, it should be done with minimal encroachment on 
these fundamental principles. Within the appropriate limit, it is better to 
                                                      
281. See supra notes 92–98 and accompanying text. 
282. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text. 
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allow more victims to recover for their actual loss than to deny such 
recovery in violation of the principle of liability for wrongful harm, 
while bestowing a windfall on a few claimants in violation of the 
principle of restitutio in integrum.283 Besides being conceptually 
problematic, the two-layer approach is inferior from a distributive justice 
(“fairness”) perspective: if liability is limited, the limited amount should 
be distributed according to merit. It is unreasonable to prioritize 
enrichment of the already compensated few over compensation to 
additional deserving victims. In the numerical example, the law should 
endeavor to compensate victims for actual harm up to the desirable 
extent of approximately $400,000.284 
Similarly, if after considering all relevant factors the court concludes 
that total liability must exceed the aggregate loss, all victims should be 
compensated for their established losses, and punitive damages should 
be awarded in addition. The traditional two-layer approach of the 
common law to cases of this sort, namely denying recovery for 
economic losses and then awarding punitive damages to successful 
claimants, requires an exceptionally large award of punitive damages to 
make up for the partial compensation. A smaller amount of punitive 
damages would reduce total liability to an undesirable level. Moreover, 
because many victims have no standing, the exceptional punitive award 
is distributed among relatively few claimants. Thus, instead of allowing 
recovery to all victims who incurred real harm and keeping the average 
windfall modest, the law bestows a substantial windfall on a very few 
claimants, while leaving many victims with nothing. 
B. The Scope of the Problem 
I have shown that the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages 
doctrine were applied in tandem in the Exxon Valdez litigation, and 
explained why this was problematic. In this subpart I demarcate the 
boundaries of the problem. First, I extract the precondition of in tandem 
application of the two rules from the Exxon Valdez case itself. Then I 
examine whether and to what extent the problem identified here 
transcends the unique setting of massive maritime pollution. 
                                                      
283. Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to someone who has already been fully 
compensated. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59, 87 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
284. Of course, we need to decide who will ultimately share this amount. I provide some 
guidelines in Part II.C., infra, understanding that courts will have to work out the details on a case-
by-case basis. 
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With regard to the precondition, the Exxon Valdez litigation is 
illustrative. The exclusionary rule applies only when the interference 
with the plaintiff’s economic relation is unintentional.285 Traditionally, 
punitive damages are awarded when the defendant’s conduct was 
outrageous, because his or her acts were done with an evil motive or 
with reckless indifference to the rights of others;286 but in some 
jurisdictions even gross negligence suffices.287 So application of the two 
rules in tandem may occur in cases of recklessness, of which the Exxon 
Valdez case is an example, and possibly in cases of extreme 
negligence.288 The problem does not arise in cases of ordinary 
negligence, where punitive damages are currently precluded.289 
Intentional conduct, on the other hand, can yield simultaneous 
application of the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine, 
even though the former does not apply to intentional interference with 
economic relations. This is so because a mean-spirited tort to the person 
or property of one person may unintentionally cause economic loss to 
others who are economically dependent on the intended victim. In these 
cases, the unintended relational losses will be irrecoverable under Robins 
Dry Dock, while punitive damages may be deemed appropriate due to 
the gravity of the wrong. 
The incoherence transcends the unique setting of a massive maritime 
pollution. First and foremost, it is not limited to maritime law. As 
explained in Part I, both rules are well-established not only in maritime 
law, but also in land-based common law.290 They may collide in similar 
circumstances in nearly all jurisdictions. There are, of course, numerous 
nuances. For instance, punitive damages may be capped in some states, 
and caps may vary.291 Similarly, some courts may recognize exceptions 
to the exclusionary rule, and these exceptions may also vary from one 
                                                      
285. Intentional interference is actionable. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 766–766B 
(1979). 
286. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979). 
287. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887 (W.Va. 1992); 
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 167, at 1305–07. 
288. Recklessness is a conscious choice of action, either with knowledge of serious danger to 
others or with knowledge of facts that would disclose the danger to any reasonable person; gross 
negligence is a significant deviation from the objective standard of reasonable care. See Ellis, supra 
note 178, at 21. 
289. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. b (1979). 
290. See supra notes 60, 63, 176 and accompanying text. 
291. See Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 
1297, 1338–49 (2005). 
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jurisdiction to another.292 But the clash between the two rules may 
surface in almost all states.293 In fact, the problem might be even more 
acute under state law, where juries often have more discretion regarding 
the size of punitive damages awards, making them more unpredictable. 
This works against the exclusionary rule in terms of promoting certainty. 
Moreover, the problem is not limited to environmental disasters. It 
was not noticed until a very salient event occurred and high-profile 
litigation ensued, but it may arise whenever unintended economic losses 
ripple out from a physical injury caused by intentional, reckless or—in 
some jurisdictions—grossly negligent conduct. For example, suppose 
that picketers recklessly injure a generator or a cable that supplies 
electricity to an industrial zone. The factories in the area will not be 
allowed to claim damages for their unintended economic losses.294 But 
the injurers’ recklessness may be a sufficient ground for awarding 
punitive damages. The picketers’ liability will be simultaneously limited 
by the exclusionary rule, and expanded by the punitive damages 
doctrine. Similarly, assume that a vehicle driven recklessly by an 
intoxicated driver collides with a bridge, thereby blocking the highway 
over the bridge and the navigable waterway under it, causing economic 
loss to thousands. Drivers and ship owners will not be able to recover for 
these losses,295 but the gravity of the wrong might enable the bridge 
owner to claim punitive damages, in addition to compensation for 
property damage. 
Arguably, the problem of contradictory adjustments of the extent of 
liability was ultimately evaded in the Exxon Valdez case. The Ninth 
Circuit found that the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act was not 
preempted by Robins Dry Dock,296 enabling at least some of the 
relational victims to claim damages. This does not undermine my thesis. 
First, the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act is an esoteric state 
statute of limited application. It seemingly solves the problem in a 
specific type of events (unauthorized release of hazardous substances) 
that take place in a limited geographical area. The problem may still 
                                                      
292. See Perry, Relational Economic Loss, supra note 76, at 779. 
293. However, Nebraska does not allow punitive damages at all. Distinctive Printing & 
Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574 (Neb. 1989). 
294. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 615 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir. 1980); Byrd v. 
English, 43 S.E. 419, 421 (Ga. 1903). 
295. See, e.g., Channel Star Excursions, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 77 F.3d 1135, 1137–38 (9th 
Cir. 1996); Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 51–53 (1st Cir. 1985); Akron Corp. 
v. M/T Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1983); Kingston Shipping Co. v. Roberts, 667 F.2d 
34, 35 (11th Cir. 1982); Kinsman Transit Co. v. Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 821–22 (2nd Cir. 1968). 
296. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1251–53 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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arise in other types of cases and in other jurisdictions. Second, the Ninth 
Circuit neither recognized the problem nor endeavored to resolve it. Its 
decision focused on the proper interpretation of Jensen concerning 
preemption, not on the proper scope of liability in the common law of 
torts (maritime or land-based). So it is unclear whether the ultimate 
scope of Exxon’s liability was indeed warranted, all relevant factors 
being considered. Even if it was, this outcome was haphazard rather than 
planned. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit in its 2001 decision allowed 
claims under the Alaska act,297 but ordered the district court to reduce 
the award of punitive damages.298 This would have been consistent with 
the normative proposition of this Article if the ultimate scope of liability 
had been determined after a conscious and careful consideration of the 
various concerns underlying the exclusionary rule and the punitive 
damages doctrine. 
C. Guidelines for Resolution 
The preceding analysis reveals an awkward phenomenon. Courts may 
simultaneously apply rules that pull the bounds of liability in opposite 
directions: the exclusionary rule reduces while the punitive damages 
doctrine increases liability, both for seemingly legitimate reasons. In 
cases of in tandem application, either rule cancels out the effects of the 
other, at least to some extent. So far, I have implied that courts need to 
determine the proper scope of liability, in accordance with the various 
considerations outlined in Part I, and then give the fullest possible effect 
to general principles of tort law—liability for wrongful harm and 
restitutio in integrum—with the necessary limit in mind. Neither the 
exclusionary rule nor the punitive damages doctrine should be applied 
separately, without regard to the rationale and effects of the other. In this 
subpart, I propose a possible framework for implementing these 
conclusions, assuming once again that the justifications for both rules 
have merit. 
The simplest case is that of ordinary negligence (or non-culpable 
conduct) resulting in physical injury and relational economic losses. In 
this case, only the rationale for the exclusionary rule is relevant, and 
liability should be limited accordingly. But if intentional, reckless, or 
grossly negligent conduct is involved, the traditional justifications for 
punitive damages emerge and call for an expansion of liability. In such a 
                                                      
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 1246–47. 
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case, the court must first determine the extent of the necessary 
expansion. 
If the normatively desirable scope of liability is equal to or lower than 
the aggregate loss, including relational economic losses, the court should 
allow recovery for actual harm incrementally up to the desirable amount, 
and preclude punitive damages. As Jane Stapleton observed, British 
Commonwealth courts have already recognized that “while the total 
extent of economic loss and the total number of victims in an economic 
loss case may be indeterminate, this . . . need not be fatal to a claim.”299 
There is no legal problem of indeterminacy if the law, on a normatively 
justifiable basis, can restrict those who can sue, and this normatively 
justified class is reasonably determinate.300 The real question then is 
what the normatively justifiable formula for limiting liability should be. 
As the expansion of liability is mandated by the underlying rationale of 
punitive damages, the formula must comply with this rationale. 
Therefore, the limit of liability may reasonably be set according to the 
gravity of the defendant’s wrong. The graver the conduct, the more 
relational victims are compensated.301 Specifically, any expansion of 
liability will enable another sphere of relational victims, whose losses 
are more remote from the primary injury, to obtain compensation.302 As 
liability for actual losses is expanded to the exact level mandated by the 
twin goals of retribution and deterrence, the need for an additional 
sanction ceases to exist. Relaxing the exclusionary rule enables the court 
to align the scope of compensatory damages with the defendant’s 
culpability and makes punitive damages redundant. 
As explained, expanding liability for actual harm is better than strict 
adherence to the exclusionary rule and a simultaneous award of punitive 
damages. The exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine are 
both exceptions to general principles of private law. If there is reason to 
limit liability, it should be done with minimal encroachment on these 
principles. The proposed method better serves the principle of liability 
                                                      
299. Stapleton, supra note 69, at 544. 
300. Id. 
301. The idea that the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct may be relevant in 
deciding whether to allow recovery for purely economic loss is not unprecedented. See, e.g., J’Aire 
Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979). However, in J’Aire, as opposed to paradigmatic 
relational loss cases, there was no physical injury, and the plaintiff was the only one who suffered 
economic loss; see also O’Brien, supra note 77, at 969, 972 (concluding based on California case 
law that liability for negligent infliction of economic loss is imposed only when the defendant’s 
conduct is significantly below that of a reasonable person). 
302. Cf. Stapleton, supra note 69, at 544–45 (stating that directness may be the normatively 
justifiable basis for expanding liability for economic loss).  
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for foreseeable harm caused by unreasonable conduct by allowing more 
victims to recover for their actual losses, and better serves the principle 
of restitutio in integrum by avoiding extra-compensatory windfalls. 
Moreover, it is superior from a distributive justice perspective, as it 
prioritizes compensation to more victims over enrichment of the already-
compensated few. 
If the normatively desirable scope of liability exceeds the aggregate 
loss, including relational economic losses, the court should allow 
recovery by relational victims, and award punitive damages up to the 
necessary level. This is preferable to in tandem application of the 
exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine. Allowing recovery 
to all victims who have incurred real harm, and keeping the average 
windfall (in the form of extra-compensatory damages) modest, is better 
than bestowing a substantial windfall on a very few victims, while 
leaving many others with nothing. Here, too, relaxing the exclusionary 
rule would be based on the concept of incremental expansion of liability 
according to the gravity of the wrong.303 
This proposed reform entails not only modification of substantive 
law, but also some procedural adjustments. Most notably, to apply the 
new model it is necessary to determine at a relatively early stage if and 
to what extent expansion of liability is warranted. Without this 
preliminary ruling the court cannot decide whether additional claims for 
economic loss should be dismissed or allowed to proceed. In fact, a 
preliminary decision of this sort was made in the Exxon Valdez 
litigation. The jury was asked to consider whether Exxon was reckless—
hence potentially liable for punitive damages—before making any 
decision on compensatory damages.304 A preliminary ruling on the 
gravity of the wrong is also necessary under the OPA to determine 
whether liability caps apply, as I explain below. 
III. OIL POLLUTION LIABILITY IN THE OPA ERA 
This Part examines whether the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act 
has created a more defensible oil pollution liability regime. Part III.A 
presents the current liability regime, using the Deepwater Horizon 
incident as a test case. Part III.A.1 systematically analyzes the relevant 
provisions of the OPA, including the imposition of strict liability on 
specific parties, defenses, recoverable damages, liability caps, and the 
                                                      
303. Liability will be expanded to the exact level mandated by the traditional goals of punitive 
damages. 
304. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 479–80 (2008). 
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implications of defendants’ degree of fault. Part III.A.2 discusses the 
role of state law within the current scheme. Part III.B acknowledges that 
the OPA maintains some correlation between the scope of liability and 
the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, and that the expansion of liability 
in cases of severe misconduct better corresponds to the general 
principles of tort law and to distributive concerns. This subpart 
demonstrates, however, that the OPA does not set the proper limits on 
liability because it is insensitive to the traditional justifications for 
exclusion of liability for economic losses on the one hand, and for 
expanding liability in the case of severe misconduct on the other hand. 
A. The Current Liability Scheme 
1. The Oil Pollution Act 
Congress attempted to enact comprehensive oil pollution legislation 
from the mid-1970s, and several bills were introduced and discussed by 
the late 1980s.305 Only the Exxon Valdez catastrophe, and a series of 
smaller, highly publicized oil spills in subsequent months, galvanized 
public and political support for legislative reform.306 The Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990307 was approved by the Senate by a vote of 99-0, and by the 
House of Representative by a vote of 360-0, and was signed by President 
George H.W. Bush on August 18, 1990.308 Because it was enacted in the 
wake of the Exxon Valdez spill, the OPA did not apply to any of the 
claims arising from that incident. So the highly complex two-decade 
litigation that followed the Exxon Valdez spill did not shed much light 
on the new statute. Judicial decisions concerning the OPA are sparse, so 
the forthcoming Deepwater Horizon litigation may generate an 
interesting discussion of various interpretive questions. 
                                                      
305. See OIL POLLUTION DESKBOOK, supra note 36, at 3, 195; Elizabeth R. Millard, Anatomy of 
an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 331, 
338–40 (1993); Van Hanswyk, supra note 28, at 338–40; Wallace & Ratcliffe, supra note 28, at 
1361–62, 1366–67. 
306. Although a series of smaller spills occurred later in 1989 and 1990, the Exxon Valdez 
incident was undoubtedly the main catalyst. See Matthew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but 
Still Unconstitutional: The Oil Pollution Act’s Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997); Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial 
Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L. 
J. 481, 482 (2000); John H. Cushman, Conferees Agree on Bill to Cover Cost of Oil Spills, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 1990, http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/29/us/conferees-agree-on-bill-to-cover-
cost-of-oil-spills.html. 
307. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2762 (2006). 
308. See Millard, supra note 305, at 368; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 35, at 11 n.68. 
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The OPA provides that “each responsible party for a vessel or a 
facility from which oil is discharged . . . into or upon the navigable 
waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable 
for the removal costs and damages . . . that result from such incident.”309 
The Act clearly applies to the Deepwater Horizon case. The exclusive 
economic zone extends to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. At the 
time of the incident, the drilling rig was located at Macondo Prospect, 
approximately forty-one miles off the southeast coast of Louisiana, well 
within the U.S. exclusive economic zone.310 Moreover, the oil spread to 
U.S. territorial waters and shorelines. 
The Act holds the “responsible party” for a vessel or a facility from 
which oil is discharged strictly liable for removal costs and 
“damages.”311 In the case of a vessel, the “responsible party” is the 
owner, operator, or demise charterer of the vessel; in the case of an 
offshore facility, the “responsible party” is “the lessee or permittee of the 
area in which the facility is located or the holder of a right of use and 
easement granted under applicable State law or the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act . . . for the area in which the facility is located.”312 BP is 
clearly a responsible party for the oil spill, as a lessee of the area in 
which the Deepwater Horizon was located.313 Technically, BP’s partners 
in the Macondo Prospect—Anadarko Petroleum (with a twenty-five 
percent working interest) and Mitsui (with a ten percent interest)—may 
also be held liable.314 Transocean is also a responsible party, because the 
Deepwater Horizon was a “mobile offshore drilling unit” (MODU), 
which is not only an offshore facility or a part thereof, but also a 
vessel,315 and Transocean was the owner and operator of this vessel.316 
                                                      
309. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
310. The OPA defines “exclusive economic zone” as: “the zone established by Presidential 
Proclamation Numbered 5030, dated March 10, 1983.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701(8). According to the 
proclamation “[t]he Exclusive Economic Zone extends to a distance 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.” Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. 
Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983), available at http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/ 
proclamations/05030.html. 
311. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2006). 
312. Id. § 2701(32)(C). 
313. Id. 
314. See John Schwartz, Liability Questions Loom for BP and Ex-Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/25liability.html. 
315. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(18), 2704(b) (2006). 
316. See CURRY L. HAGERTY & JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: 
SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
misc/R41262.pdf. 
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Not surprisingly, the Coast Guard officially named both BP and 
Transocean as “responsible parties” in the incident.317 According to 
Transocean officials, the company’s contract with BP obliges the latter 
to indemnify the former for the costs and liabilities incurred following 
the spill.318 Still, BP has already paid claims and might seek 
reimbursement from other parties. 
The OPA recognizes three limited defenses to liability. It provides 
that a responsible party is not liable for removal costs and damages 
where the spill was caused solely by (1) an act of God, (2) an act of war, 
or (3) an act or omission of a third party.319 The first two apply in 
extremely unusual circumstances. The third (act of a third party) is 
narrowed down in two critical respects.320 First, it does not apply where 
the third party was an employee, an agent or a person whose conduct 
occurs “in connection with any contractual relationship” with the 
responsible party.321 At least one court has broadly interpreted the term 
“any contractual relationship” to include any commercial contact, even 
in the absence of a formal contract.322 So even if the manufacturer of the 
blowout preventer used by BP (Cameron International) and the cement 
contractor (Halliburton) were negligent,323 and their negligence was the 
sole cause of the accident, BP will not be absolved. Second, the third 
defense applies only if the responsible party exercised due care with 
respect to the oil concerned and took precautions against foreseeable acts 
of third parties and their foreseeable consequences.324 No defense is 
available if the responsible party failed or refused to report the incident, 
provide reasonable cooperation and assistance in connection with 
cleanup efforts, or comply with orders issued with regard to cleanup.325 
                                                      
317. See Tom Zeller, BP Is in the Spotlight for Now, but 3 Other Companies Could Share the 
Blame, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/09blame.html. 
318. See Schwartz, supra note 314. 
319. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006). 
320. Id. § 2703(a)(3). 
321. Id.  
322. Int’l Marine Carriers v. Oil Spill Liab. Trust Fund, 903 F. Supp. 1097, 1105–06 (S.D. Tex. 
1994). 
323. See, e.g., John M. Broder, Panel Says Firms Knew of Cement Flaws Before Spill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/29/us/29spill.html (“Halliburton officials 
knew weeks before the fatal explosion of the BP well in the Gulf of Mexico that the cement mixture 
they planned to use to seal the bottom of the well was unstable but still went ahead with the job.”). 
The National Commission’s letter is available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/ 
science/spilldoc.PDF. 
324. 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3) (2006). 
325. Id. § 2703(c). 
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The responsible party is liable, first, for removal costs incurred by the 
United States, a state, or an Indian tribe, and by any person who carries 
out cleanup activities in accordance with the National Contingency Plan 
prepared and published under the FWPCA.326 The OPA generally limits 
a responsible party’s liability for removal costs and damages. For 
example, in the case of a discharge from a large double-hull vessel, 
liability is limited to the greater of $1900 per gross ton or 
$16,000,000.327 But in the case of an oil spill from an offshore facility, 
the responsible party’s liability for removal costs (as opposed to 
damages) is unlimited.328 The Deepwater Horizon was a MODU—a 
vessel and an offshore facility—so the OPA allocates liability as 
follows: the MODU’s owner or operator (Transocean) is liable for 
removal costs and damages up to the relevant tonnage-based cap, and the 
party responsible for the offshore facility (BP and its partners) bears 
unlimited liability for removal costs in excess of the MODU’s share.329 
In addition to removal costs, the OPA enumerates six categories of 
recoverable “damages”:330 (1) harm to natural resources331 (recoverable 
by a trustee), namely the cost of restoring or rehabilitating the 
environment and the diminution in value of natural resources pending 
restoration;332 (2) injury to real or personal property, including 
consequential economic loss (recoverable by the owner or lessee of the 
property); (3) loss of subsistence use of natural resources; (4) loss of 
taxes, royalties, rents, fees or net profit shares (recoverable by the United 
States or a state); (5) loss of profits or impairment of earning capacity 
due to an injury to property or natural resources; (6) costs of providing 
public services during or after removal activities. The OPA does not 
authorize compensation for personal injuries. 
The fifth category of recoverable damages seems to embrace 
economic losses caused by an injury to natural resources or to property 
not belonging to the plaintiff, namely relational economic losses. But the 
OPA does not clarify which classes of claimants are covered by this 
provision. The House Conference Report explains that “[t]he claimant 
need not be the owner of the damaged property or resources to recover 
                                                      
326. Id. §§ 2701(19), 2702(b)(1). 
327. Id. § 2704(a)(1). 
328. Id. § 2704(a)(3). 
329. Id. § 2704(b). 
330. Id. § 2702(b)(2). 
331. Id. § 2701(20) (defining natural resources as “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground 
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources.”). 
332. Id. §§ 2702(b)(2)(A), 2706(d). 
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for lost profits or income,”333 but provides only a single example: “a 
fisherman may recover lost income due to damaged fisheries resources, 
even though the fisherman does not own those resources.”334 Alas, 
fishermen were entitled to compensation even under pre-OPA maritime 
law, as explained at length above.335 The question is whether the OPA 
expanded liability beyond the traditional bounds. According to the 
conventional view, the OPA completely supersedes Robins Dry Dock, 
and allows recovery for purely economic losses resulting from oil 
spills,336 although at least one court has held the opposite position.337 
But even if the majority view prevails, claimants under the OPA may 
be required to satisfy a proximate cause test. In discussing a claim 
brought under TAPAA by California drivers who had to pay higher 
prices for gasoline following the Exxon Valdez spill, the Ninth Circuit 
held that plaintiffs’ losses were “remote and derivative . . . [and] fall 
outside the zone of dangers against which Congress intended to protect 
when it passed TAPAA.”338 Presumably, the OPA will be construed and 
applied in a similar manner.339 
The question of liability for purely economic losses is likely to arise 
in the Deepwater Horizon litigation and out-of-court negotiations. If BP 
was grossly negligent, its liability under the OPA will not be limited, as 
explained below. Under those circumstances, the scope of liability for 
purely economic losses will have a considerable impact on BP’s 
condition. If, on the other hand, BP was not grossly negligent, liability 
for purely economic losses will dilute the pool available for 
compensating traditional tort claimants. Either way, at least one party 
will have a clear interest in bringing up the economic loss issue. 
                                                      
333. See supra Part I.A.1.b. 
334. H.R. REP. NO. 101-653, at 103 (1990) (Conf. Rep.). 
335. Id. 
336. See In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252 (9th Cir. 2001); Ballard Shipping Co. v. 
Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630–31 (1st Cir. 1994); Sekco Energy, Inc.v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 
820 F. Supp. 1008, 1014–15 (E.D. La. 1993); Harrington, supra note 306, at 8–13; Kiern, supra 
note 306, at 531–32; Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 28, at 15; Swanson, supra note 38, at 152–55; 
Sturla Olsen, Comment, Recovery for the Lost Use of Water Resources: M/V Testbank on the 
Rocks?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 271, 286–88 (1992); Cameron H. Totten, Note, Recovery for Economic 
Loss Under Robins Dry Dock and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Sekco Energy, Inc. v. M/V 
Margaret Chouest, 18 TUL. MAR. L.J. 167, 171–73, 177 (1993). 
337. In re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 678–79 (E.D. Mich 1992) 
(“[§ 2702(b)(2)(E)] allows damages only for ‘loss of profits . . . due to the injury, destruction, or 
loss of real property, personal property, or natural resources.’ None of the claimants . . . have 
alleged ‘injury, destruction, or loss’ to their property.”). 
338. Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1992). 
339. See Olsen, supra note 336, at 287. 
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The party responsible for an offshore facility incident is liable for 
“damages” up to a $75 million limit.340 The Deepwater Horizon was a 
MODU, so the OPA allocates liability for “damages” as follows: the 
MODU’s owner or operator (Transocean) is liable for removal costs and 
damages up to a tonnage-based cap, as explained above, and the party 
responsible for the offshore facility (BP and its partners) is liable for 
damages in excess of the MODU’s share and up to the $75 million cap 
(in addition to unlimited liability for removal costs).341 Transocean’s 
overall liability for removal costs and damages based on tonnage is 
estimated at $65 million,342 leaving BP liable not only for most of the 
removal costs, but also for a significant portion of the “damages.”343 
Calls have been made to raise liability caps following the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill, but retroactive application of such an amendment 
seems unlikely.344 In any event, regardless of the statutory cap, BP 
agreed to establish a $20 billion escrow account over a three-and-a-half-
year period to satisfy legitimate and objectively verifiable claims 
including natural resource damages and state and local response costs.345 
The statutory limits do not apply if the incident was caused by gross 
negligence or willful misconduct of the responsible party, an agent or 
employee of the responsible party, or a person acting pursuant to a 
contractual relationship with the responsible party; or by violation of an 
applicable federal safety, construction, or operating regulation by any of 
these parties.346 In other words, where punitive damages might be 
appropriate under general maritime law due to the severity of the 
defendant’s conduct, the OPA responds to the exceptional severity by 
removing liability caps. Additionally, the caps do not apply if the 
responsible party failed or refused to report the incident, to provide 
reasonable cooperation and assistance in cleanup efforts, or to comply 
with orders issued with regard to cleanup.347 
                                                      
340. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(3) (2006). 
341. Id. § 2704(b). 
342. See HAGERTY & RAMSEUR, supra note 316, at 11. 
343. Note that the statutory limit on Transocean’s liability applies to the total of removal costs 
and “damages,” so only part of the $65 million will actually cover “damages.” BP will be liable for 
“damages” in excess of this part, up to $75 million. 
344. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, White House Proposes Bill to Lift Caps on Offshore Oil Spill 
Liability, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/12/12greenwire-
white-house-proposes-bill-to-lift-caps-on-offs-45047.html. 
345. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-521, at 6 (2010). 
346. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006). 
347. Id. § 2704(c)(2). 
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The ultimate determinations of fact in the Deepwater Horizon case 
may be difficult to predict, but preliminary investigation indicates that a 
claim of gross negligence may arise.348 For instance, newspaper reports 
indicate that several days before the explosion, BP officials chose, partly 
for financial reasons, to use a type of casing for the well that the 
company knew was the riskier of two options.349 Allegedly, the blowout 
preventer (BOP) was not properly tested even though it was leaking on 
at least three occasions.350 Moreover, while it was known that the blind 
shear ram—a BOP component that cuts off an uncontrollable well—
might fail, especially at considerable depths, neither Transocean nor BP 
took steps to outfit the Deepwater Horizon’s blowout preventer with a 
second blind shear ram.351 Furthermore, the BOP did not have a remote-
control shut-off switch (“acoustic switch”), a last-resort protection 
mechanism; it is not required by U.S. regulators, but is mandatory in 
Brazil and Norway, and is used by other major oil companies even 
where not mandatory.352 At an investigative hearing conducted by the 
Coast Guard, a BP official testified that in the days before the explosion, 
BP continued drilling for oil “despite internal reports of a leak on a 
critical safety device on the rig.”353 An interim report of a team of 
experts commissioned by Interior Secretary Kenneth Salazar concluded, 
inter alia, that “[n]umerous decisions to proceed . . . despite indications 
of hazard, such as the results of repeated negative-pressure tests, suggest 
an insufficient consideration of risk and a lack of operating 
discipline . . . . The net effect of these decisions was to reduce the 
available margins of safety . . . .”354 
The OPA responds to gross negligence by removing liability caps. On 
the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held a decade 
                                                      
348. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 314 (quoting the CEO of BP’s partner Anadarko Petroleum, 
saying that “BP’s behavior and actions likely represent gross negligence or willful misconduct.”). 
349. See Ian Urbina, Documents Show Early Worries About Safety of Rig, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/30/us/30rig.html. 
350. See id. 
351. See David Barstow et al., Regulators Failed to Address Risks on Oil Rig Fail-Safe Device, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html. 
352. See Russell Gold et al., Leaking Oil Well Lacked Safeguard Device, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704423504575212031417936798.html. 
353. See Robbie Brown, BP Kept Drilling After Report of Leak, Worker Says, N.Y. TIMES, July 
20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/us/21hearings.html. 
354. DONALD C. WINTER, INTERIM REPORT ON CAUSES OF THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL RIG 
BLOWOUT AND WAYS TO PREVENT SUCH EVENTS 3 (Nov. 16, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/ 
public/resources/documents/spillreport20101116.pdf. The interim report identified several factors 
that precipitated the disaster, including flawed cementing operations, BOP failures, and 
unsatisfactory operating management processes. The final report is expected in June 2011. 
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ago that punitive damages were not allowed under this Act.355 The court 
explained that the OPA set forth a comprehensive list of recoverable 
damages and that the absence of punitive damages from the list was a 
good indication of Congress’s intention to exclude such damages.356 The 
federal district court in Oregon added that the victim’s 
“opportunity . . . to overcome [the cap] with a showing of gross 
negligence” also pointed to the same congressional intent.357 It noted, 
however, that the OPA only applied to property damage and economic 
losses, so if an oil spill resulted in personal injury or loss of life, punitive 
damages would still be available under general maritime law, unless 
preempted by another federal statute.358 
Still, assuming that the punitive damages issue has been settled would 
be imprudent. The OPA unequivocally states that “[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided in this Act, this Act does not affect admiralty and maritime 
law.”359 Punitive damages were not explicitly excluded, so the saving 
clause arguably preserves this remedy. Moreover, in Exxon Shipping Co. 
v. Baker,360 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the argument that the 
FWPCA preempted the maritime law doctrine of punitive damages.361 
The Court’s reasoning is pertinent. First, it addressed the argument that 
“because the saving clause362 [which mentions only liability for property 
damage] makes no mention of preserving punitive damages . . . they are 
preempted.”363 The Court correctly observed that this type of argument 
equally applied to other categories of damages not specifically 
mentioned in the FWPCA saving clause, such as personal injuries 
resulting from oil spills, and that no one would dare say that recovery for 
these injuries was consequently preempted.364 Analogously, the absence 
of punitive damages from the list of recoverable damages under the OPA 
cannot justify their preemption, because physical injuries are also absent 
and clearly not preempted. The Exxon Court subsequently addressed the 
                                                      
355. S. Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. P’ship, 234 F.3d 58, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2000). 
356. Id. at 65; see also Clausen v. M/V New Carissa, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1133 (D. Or. 2001) 
(“[T]he OPA has precluded an award of punitive damages under any general maritime or admiralty 
law theory for any claim for which the OPA could provide relief.”). 
357. Clausen, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1133–34. 
358. Id. at 1134. 
359. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (2006). 
360. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
361. Id. at 487–88. 
362. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o) (2006). 
363. 554 U.S. at 488. 
364. Id. at 488–89. 
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alternative claim that the FWPCA preempted punitive damages but not 
compensatory damages, finding that “nothing in the statutory text points 
to fragmenting the recovery scheme this way.”365 Finally, the Court 
emphasized that “to abrogate a common-law principle, the statute must 
speak directly to the question addressed by the common law.”366 The 
OPA, just like the FWPCA, does not do so.367 
From the victims’ perspective, the OPA liability cap is further 
curtailed by the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (Fund), which 
consolidated, enhanced and superseded previously existing oil spill 
compensation funds.368 The Fund has several sources of revenue, of 
which the largest is a tax collected for every barrel of crude oil received 
at U.S. refineries, domestic crude oil used in or exported from the United 
States, and petroleum products brought into the United States.369 In 
principle, all claims for removal costs or damages must be presented first 
to the responsible party.370 This is a prerequisite for a subsequent 
lawsuit.371 If the claim is presented and the responsible party denies 
liability or the claim is not settled within ninety days, the claimant may 
elect to commence an action in court against the responsible party or to 
present the claim to the Fund.372 The claimant may also present a claim 
to the Fund where full compensation from the responsible party is 
unavailable.373 But even when the statutory conditions for Fund 
payments are met, the Fund does not guarantee full compensation. First, 
it can pay up to $1 billion per incident.374 This amount may be sufficient 
in the vast majority of cases, but is clearly inadequate in catastrophic 
                                                      
365. Id. at 489. 
366. Id. 
367. Implying that it does not preclude punitive damages. 
368. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(a) (2006). 
369. Id. § 4611. This tax is suspended when the fund reaches its statutory liability limit. For other 
sources see, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2706(f) (2006) (stating that sums recovered by a trustee for an injury 
to natural resources and not used “to reimburse or pay costs incurred by the trustee” in accordance 
with the OPA, must be deposited in the fund); id. § 2715 (stating that after paying compensation for 
removal costs or damages, the Fund is “subrogated to all rights, claims, and causes of action that the 
[payee] has under any other law”). All amounts held by the Deepwater Port Liability Fund, the 
Offshore Oil Pollution Compensation Fund, and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund, were also 
transferred to the Fund. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(5)–(7) (2006). 
370. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(a) (2006). 
371. See Russo v. M/V Dubai Star, No. C09-05158, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50967, at *6–8 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 29, 2010); Boca Ciega Hotel v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 844 F. Supp. 1512, 1514–15 (M.D. 
Fla. 1994); Johnson v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 830 F. Supp. 309, 310–11 (E.D. Va. 1993). 
372. 33 U.S.C. § 2713(c) (2006). 
373. Id. at § 2713(d). 
374. 26 U.S.C. § 9509(c)(2)(A) (2006). 
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incidents of the Deepwater Horizon magnitude. Second, the billion 
dollar fund may be depleted by payments for harm to natural resources 
(up to $500 million) and removal costs. This may leave many individual 
victims with only a forlorn hope of recovery. 
Note that a responsible party may seek reimbursement from the Fund 
of amounts it paid in excess of the statutory cap, or full reimbursement 
when a complete defense to liability applies.375 If the incident was 
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct of the responsible 
party, the cap does not apply, and the responsible party cannot seek 
reimbursement from the Fund.376 At any rate, even if BP was not grossly 
negligent and can formally assert a claim against the Fund for sums paid 
in excess of the cap, it announced that it “will not seek reimbursement 
from the U.S. government or the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.”377 
In sum, the OPA—just like the pre-OPA maritime law—is sensitive 
to the gravity of the defendant’s conduct, but it addresses this matter 
differently. In cases of ordinary negligence or lack of fault, the Act, 
unlike general maritime law, allows recovery for purely economic 
losses, but sets rigid liability caps, making the oil spill fund available for 
the payment of claims in excess of the responsible parties’ liability caps. 
In cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct the Act responds in 
the following way. First, it eliminates the responsible party’s liability 
cap. Second, it does not allow the responsible party to seek any 
reimbursement from the Fund. Third, arguably, it does not allow 
punitive damages. Put differently, while general maritime law responds 
to severe misconduct by allowing a very exclusive group of successful 
claimants to obtain extra-compensatory payments, the OPA removes the 
statutory limit of the defendant’s liability to a much more inclusive 
group of recognized claimants. 
A discussion of the interrelation between the OPA and pre-OPA 
maritime law is not limited to the availability of punitive damages 
against OPA defendants. Other derivatives of the general question are 
whether the OPA excludes recovery under general maritime law in 
excess of the OPA caps or against non-OPA defendants. In discussing 
the interrelation between the TAPAA and general maritime law 
following the Exxon Valdez incident, the district court held that general 
                                                      
375. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2708, 2713(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
376. The responsible party can assert a claim only if it is entitled to a defense or a limitation of 
liability, and in the case of gross negligence liability limitation does not apply; see also id. 
§ 2712(b). 
377. See Letter from Tony Hayward, CEO, BP, to Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. (May 16, 2010) (on file with author). 
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maritime law applied to any sums in excess of the statutory caps, and to 
any defendants not covered by the statute.378 The OPA seems even 
clearer on this matter. As explained above, it states that “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided in this Act, this Act does not affect admiralty and 
maritime law.”379 Arguably, those entitled to a remedy under general 
maritime law, either from “responsible parties” or from others, may 
pursue these claims.380 Indeed, at least one court held that the OPA 
“preempts maritime law as to recovery of cleanup expenses and the cost 
of compensating injured persons.”381 According to this view, the savings 
clause “only preserves admiralty claims which are not addressed in 
OPA”382 (such as collision damages or personal injuries) and “[b]ecause 
OPA provides a comprehensive scheme for the recovery of oil spill 
cleanup costs and the compensation of those injured by oil spills, the 
general maritime law does not apply to recovery of these types of 
damages.”383 But this issue has not yet been addressed by an appellate 
court, and is therefore far from settled. Consequently, parties involved in 
the Deepwater Horizon operation but not responsible under the OPA, 
such as the BOP manufacturer (Cameron International) and the cement 
contractor (Halliburton), may end up liable for at least some of the loss 
under general maritime law. 
2. State Law 
Apart from common law remedies, most coastal states—including 
those adjoining the Gulf of Mexico—have oil pollution legislation with 
strict, often uncapped, liability provisions.384 State legislation naturally 
                                                      
378. In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-0095-CV, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20555, at *6–7 (D. Alaska 
Jan. 26, 1994); In re Exxon Valdez, No. A89-095, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22495, at *12 (D. Alaska 
Dec. 23, 1992); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509, 1515–16, 1517 (D. Alaska 1991). 
379. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (2006). 
380. See Harrington, supra note 306, at 55–58. 




384. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.822–46.03.824 (2010); CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 8670.3, 
.56.5 (2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6207–6209 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 376.12, .313 (West 
2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-51 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128D-6 (LexisNexis 2006 & 
Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:2004, 2025–2026 (2000 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 38, §§ 543, 551–52 (2001 & Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., ENVIR. §§ 4-401–4-410 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 21E, § 5 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 146-A (2005 & Supp. 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g (2006 & Supp. 2010); N.Y. NAV. 
LAW § 181 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.83–143-215.94 (2009 & 
Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 468B.300–468B.335 (2003 & Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
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varies with respect to recoverable losses (purely economic losses in 
particular), liability caps, defenses, etc.385 
The enactment of the OPA rekindled the debate on the interplay 
between federal and state law. The House of Representatives’ version of 
the bill stated that “except as provided in this Act . . . no action arising 
out of a discharge of oil . . . may be brought in any court of the United 
States or of any State”; but following staunch opposition of the Senate, 
environmental groups, the National Association of Attorneys General, 
and others, an amendment to preserve state power was introduced and 
ultimately passed.386 The Senate bill similarly preserved states’ authority 
to impose additional liability.387 The compromise bill reported by the 
conference committee unsurprisingly included a savings clause.388 
The OPA thus provided that it should not be interpreted “as 
preempting the authority of any State. . . from imposing any additional 
liability. . . with respect to the discharge of oil. . . within such State” or 
as modifying “the obligations or liabilities of any person under. . . State 
law, including common law.”389 These clauses explicitly preserved 
existing state common law and oil pollution legislation, and allowed 
subsequent expansion of liability by the states.390 Moreover, the OPA 
superseded the Shipowners’ Limitation of Liability Act of 1851,391 
which could limit liability under state law prior to OPA’s enactment.392 
Finally, the OPA provides that it should not affect or be construed to 
affect “the authority of any State to establish, or to continue in effect, a 
fund [that pays] for costs or damages arising out of. . . oil pollution.”393 
Two questions arise in this respect. The first is whether purely 
economic losses in excess of the OPA limit may be recovered under 
                                                      
§ 46-12-21 (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-43-580–48-43-600 (2008); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE 
§ 40.202 (West 2001); TEX. WATER CODE § 26.265 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.34:18 
(2006); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.56.360–90.56.370 (2010); see also Nat’l Shipping Co. of Saudi 
Arabia v. Moran Mid-Atl. Corp., 924 F. Supp. 1436, 1448 (E.D. Va. 1996) (observing that when 
OPA was enacted, twenty-four states had oil spill liability legislation, of which seventeen had no 
liability limits). 
385. See Harrington, supra note 306, at 3, 54, 61–62. 
386. See Millard, supra note 306, at 351–54 (discussing the preemption provision). 
387. Id. at 360–61. 
388. Id. at 364. 
389. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (2006). 
390. See also United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 (2000) (holding that § 2718(a) was 
intended to preserve state laws and powers only with respect to liability and financial requirements). 
391. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181–189 (2006). 
392. 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (2006); see also Kiern, supra note 306, at 529–30. 
393. 33 U.S.C. § 2718(b) (2006). 
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state law. This question may be crucial in the Deepwater Horizon case if 
liability under the OPA is limited, that is, if BP’s acts fall short of gross 
negligence, willful misconduct, or a violation of an applicable federal 
regulation. Given the magnitude of the incident and the nature of the 
ensuing losses, allowing recovery for purely economic losses under state 
law may increase BP’s overall liability considerably. Admittedly, the 
OPA has not put an end to the controversy over the possible preemption 
of liability under state law by Robins Dry Dock. Some think that the 
OPA allowed the states to extend liability not only beyond the limits set 
by the OPA, but also beyond general maritime law, including Robins 
Dry Dock.394 Others believe that state power is still subject to Jensen, so 
there can be no liability for purely economic loss.395 Some follow the 
authority of Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,396 holding that given the 
Framers’ intent—manifested in the Admiralty Clause of the 
Constitution—to secure uniformity in maritime law, Congress’s 
legislative power in this area is exclusive and non-delegable; thus, the 
OPA’s delegation of power to the states was unconstitutional.397 
The second question is whether punitive damages are also allowed 
under state law.398 On the one hand, the OPA purports to be 
comprehensive, and arguably excludes punitive damages.399 So allowing 
such damages under state law might contravene Congress’s intentions, 
just as allowing them under general maritime law would. On the other 
hand, the OPA explicitly empowers the states to impose “any additional 
liability.” This may cover not only liability in excess of the OPA limit in 
cases of ordinary negligence, but also punitive damages in cases of gross 
negligence or willful misconduct.400 
                                                      
394. See, e.g., In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1252 (9th Cir. 2001); Ballard Shipping Co. v. 
Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 630–31 (1st. Cir. 1994). 
395. See Swanson, supra note 38, at 411–15. 
396. 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). 
397. See Harrington, supra note 306, at 2–3, 30–52, 71–72. 
398. State regulation of punitive damages varies. A few states award them rarely, or not at all, 
and others permit them only when authorized by statute. Many have statutory limits, in the form of 
absolute caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or some combination of the 
two. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 494–98 (2008). 
399. See supra notes 355–66 and accompanying text. 
400. See Swanson, supra note 38, at 155 (stating that the OPA does not necessarily preempt 
punitive damages under state law); Paige Kohn, Note, Oil and Water Do Not Mix: An Argument for 
the United States Supreme Court’s Deferral to Congress in Exxon v. Baker, 38 CAP. U. L. REV. 
229, 261 (2009). 
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B. A Critical Appraisal of the Current Scheme 
At first glance, the OPA seems to comply with the general guidelines 
set forth in Part II of this Article. In cases of ordinary negligence, 
liability is limited for reasons that partly overlap the traditional 
justifications for the exclusionary rule in general maritime law. The 
OPA arguably “seeks to balance the need to make industries which 
benefit from the transport of oil internalize the costs of pollution, while 
at the same time avoiding the possibility that responsible vessel owners 
will be driven from the industry with crippling damage awards.”401 In 
cases of gross negligence or willful misconduct, the OPA allows 
expansion of liability beyond the general caps, for reasons that overlap 
the traditional justifications for punitive damages. Put differently, the 
scope of liability is roughly correlated with the severity of the 
defendant’s conduct. 
Moreover, the expansion of liability in cases of gross negligence or 
willful misconduct seems more in line with the general principles of tort 
law and more responsive to distributive concerns. First, the OPA 
provides that the statutory limits do not apply if the incident was caused 
by gross negligence or willful misconduct of the responsible party.402 
Second, at least according to South Port Marine, LLC v. Gulf Oil Ltd. 
Partnership,403 the OPA does not allow punitive damages. This seems 
reasonable, because the OPA responds to the gravity of the conduct by 
removing the caps on damages. So unlike general maritime law, the 
OPA expands liability by allowing more victims to recover for their 
actual loss, not by allowing a few successful claimants to obtain a 
windfall while leaving all other victims uncompensated. It seemingly 
makes the punishment fit the crime without using extra-compensatory 
damages. The odd outcome of the simultaneous application of the 
exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine—many 
uncompensated victims and an overcompensated few—is avoided. 
However, the OPA does not provide a satisfactory solution for the 
fundamental problem, namely setting the proper limit on liability in light 
of all relevant factors. Assume first that the responsible party is guilty of 
mere negligence. Like general maritime law, the OPA limits liability, 
but differently. Rather than excluding liability for purely economic 
losses (subject to the fishermen’s exception), the OPA allows recovery 
for proximately caused purely economic losses but sets a cap on overall 
                                                      
401. Harrington, supra note 306, at 2, 17. 
402. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1) (2006). 
403. 234 F.3d 58, 64–66 (1st Cir. 2000). 
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liability. This is crucial if there is a normatively relevant difference 
between purely economic losses and other types of injury, or if allowing 
claims by more victims has other unwarranted consequences. For 
instance, given the limited pool that successful claimants ultimately need 
to share under the OPA, liability for relational economic losses may 
forestall full recovery for injuries to physical interests that may be 
deemed more worthy of legal protection. Additionally, each victim may 
end up with compensation for a very small fraction of his or her loss, 
making the costly process futile. Furthermore, liability limits are 
determined somewhat arbitrarily, without taking into account factors that 
seem relevant to determining the scope of liability. For example, if many 
relational economic losses are not true social costs, recovery for these 
losses in cases of ordinary negligence should be generally denied. 
Therefore, if the extent of injuries to tangible resources, including 
personal property and natural resources, is lower than the statutory cap, 
liability under the OPA—which also covers purely economic losses—
will exceed the proper amount. 
Now assume the defendant is guilty of gross negligence, recklessness, 
or willful misconduct. In that case, the OPA imposes liability for all 
proximately caused harm, including purely economic losses. This is 
clearly inconsistent with my theoretical analysis and the proposed 
model. I explained that even where the traditional justifications for 
punitive damages emerge and call for an expansion of liability, the 
normatively desirable scope of liability might still be lower than the 
aggregate loss, including relational economic losses.404 Simply put, 
liability for all proximately caused harm may be excessive. The OPA 
seems to ignore this possibility. 
Additionally, if liability is expanded beyond the default to achieve the 
traditional goals of punitive damages, the extent of liability should 
reflect the relative gravity of the wrong. The United States Supreme 
Court thus held that the main guideposts considered in reviewing 
punitive damages awards are the degree of reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s misconduct,405 and the ratio between punitive and 
compensatory damages.406 More egregious conduct entails a higher ratio. 
A supplementary distinction applies in maritime law: in cases of 
recklessness that do not raise unique enforcement problems, the ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages cannot exceed 1:1,407 
                                                      
404. See supra Part II.C. 
405. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–80 (1996). 
406. Id. at 580–83. 
407. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 510–15 (2008). 
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though this limit does not apply in cases of more egregious conduct, 
such as malice or avarice.408 The proposed model similarly determines 
the proper amount of damages in light of the relevant factors, including 
the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, and then allows recovery 
for actual losses incrementally up to the desirable amount. The OPA, on 
the other hand, lays down a dichotomous rule: limited liability in cases 
of mere negligence (or no fault), and unlimited liability in more severe 
cases. As long as the defendant is guilty of more than mere negligence, 
the scope of liability is not affected by the relative gravity of the wrong. 
Gross negligence, recklessness, malice, etc., are treated equally. 
Moreover, the OPA seemingly precludes punitive damages. In Exxon 
Shipping Co. v. Baker,409 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the FWPCA 
did not preempt punitive damages.410 This conclusion seems defensible 
because the FWPCA did not provide for additional liability for actual 
harm in the case of gross negligence. The OPA does, so punitive 
damages seem redundant. However, as explained in Part II.C above, in 
rare cases the normatively desirable scope of liability may exceed the 
aggregate provable loss, including relational economic losses. In those 
cases, all victims should be allowed to recover, and punitive damages 
should be awarded up to the necessary level. As currently interpreted, 
the OPA does not allow punitive damages at all. An alternative—and 
proper—interpretation would be that while punitive damages should 
generally be denied, they can be awarded in very rare cases in which 
removing liability caps is insufficient. 
Furthermore, the OPA lifts liability caps not only if the incident was 
caused by gross negligence or willful misconduct, but also if it was 
caused by “the violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or 
operating regulation.”411 Such violations may at times be technical and 
petty. Thus, the Act enables expansion of liability even in cases that do 
not manifest the level of reprehensibility traditionally associated with 
punitive damages. Uncapped liability may be permitted even when the 
justifications for limiting liability apply, while the justifications for 
expanding liability do not. 
Finally, I explained above that the exclusionary rule provided a 
certain and easily applicable limit on tort liability, and that the punitive 
damages doctrine reinstated some uncertainty due to the stark 
                                                      
408. See also Jones, supra note 149, at 1302. 
409. 554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
410. Id. at 488–89. 
411. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(B) (2006). 
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unpredictability of the awards.412 However, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that in reviewing awards of punitive damages under the Due Process 
Clause, courts ought to consider three guideposts, which reduce the level 
of uncertainty.413 The Court further reduced uncertainty in general 
maritime law (as opposed to land-based law), holding that the ratio 
between punitive and compensatory damages in cases of recklessness 
should not exceed 1:1.414 The OPA seems quite responsive to the need 
for certainty in cases of ordinary negligence, but is less sensitive to this 
concern in cases of gross negligence, recklessness, and willful 
misconduct. While the extent of liability for ordinary negligence under 
the Act is clear-cut, liability for more serious wrongdoing is truly open-
ended. There are neither limits nor guideposts, so the ultimate scope of 
liability is utterly unpredictable. Congress may address this problem by 
replacing the limited/unlimited liability dichotomy with differential 
limits.415 
To conclude, the OPA represents a commendable step. It responds to 
reprehensible conduct by allowing more victims to recover for their 
actual losses, not by allowing a few successful claimants to obtain a 
windfall while leaving all other victims uncompensated. However, it 
does not fully conform to the general guidelines set forth in Part II.C. 
More importantly, as explained in Part II.B, the problem of simultaneous 
application of the exclusionary rule and the punitive damages doctrine 
transcends the unique setting of catastrophic oil spills. Any achievement 
of the OPA is limited to the esoteric case of marine oil pollution, 
whereas the general problem remains. 
The OPA savings clauses further complicate the situation. On the one 
hand, allowing states to impose unlimited liability makes the most 
significant feature of the reform, namely liability caps, practically 
meaningless. As one commentator noted, Congress attempted to make 
responsible parties assume as much of the burden for prevention and 
cleanup as possible without subjecting them to financial ruin.416 But 
“with a single, superficially simple provision, [Congress] upset this 
                                                      
412. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 497–501. 
413. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–85 (1996). 
414. Exxon Shipping, 554 U.S. at 510–15. 
415. Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a–451(a) (2006 & Supp. 2010), which provides that a 
person who causes pollution is liable for all removal costs, that if the pollution was negligently 
caused, that person may be liable for damages up to 1.5 times the cost incurred, and that if the 
pollution was willfully caused, that person may be liable for damages equal to two times the cost 
incurred. 
416. Harrington, supra note 306, at 12. 
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balance by permitting states to impose unlimited strict liability on 
vessels which discharge oil into state waters.”417 State legislation which 
allows unlimited recovery for purely economic losses reinstates the 
initial problem of open-ended liability. On the other hand, the possibility 
of awarding punitive damages under state law in cases of gross 
negligence, recklessness or malice, may be used to remedy one of the 
lesser flaws of the OPA. Lifting liability caps, along with criminal and 
civil fines, will usually provide sufficient levels of retribution and 
deterrence in cases of this sort. Punitive damages may nonetheless be 
appropriate in very exceptional cases where all other sanctions seem 
inadequate. 
CONCLUSION 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill holds the dubious title of the largest 
accidental release of oil in world history. As opposed to the Exxon 
Valdez case, which was litigated for nearly two decades under general 
maritime law and area-specific legislation, the Deepwater Horizon 
incident is subject to the Oil Pollution Act, which was enacted in the 
wake of the Exxon Valdez spill. The purpose of this Article has been to 
illuminate a general problem in American land-based and maritime tort 
law that surfaced against the backdrop of the Exxon litigation, and to 
examine whether subsequent statutory reform has eliminated the 
problem in the limited context of marine oil pollution, using the 
Deepwater Horizon incident as a test case. 
Part I discussed pre-OPA law as applied to the Exxon Valdez case. It 
first showed that relational economic losses were generally irrecoverable 
under Robins Dry Dock, and reviewed the main justifications for the 
exclusionary rule, including the fear of open-ended liability, the idea that 
many relational losses are not true social costs, victims’ ability to protect 
themselves, and the simplicity of the bright-line rule. In accordance with 
the Oppen exception to the exclusionary rule, Exxon was found liable 
for the lost catch of commercial fishermen and Alaska Natives, but all 
other claims for relational losses were rejected. Part I then explained the 
concept of punitive damages and its dominant justifications, namely 
retribution and deterrence. In the Exxon Valdez case, the jury awarded 
the successful claimants $5 billion in punitive damages. The issue went 
back and forth between the district court and the court of appeals, until 
the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately reduced the punitive award to $507.5 
                                                      
417. Id. at 2. 
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million. Lastly, Part I discussed relevant federal and state legislation, 
such as the TAPAA, and the Alaska Environmental Conservation Act, 
invoked by the claimants in the Exxon Valdez litigation. 
Part II explained why pre-OPA maritime law gave rise to incongruity 
on the justificatory level. Applying the exclusionary rule and the 
punitive damages doctrine in tandem in a particular case pulls the limits 
of civil liability in opposing directions. Each rule seemingly cancels out 
the warranted effects of the other, at least to some extent. Moreover, 
applying the two rules in a single case futilely violates general principles 
of tort law and generates distributive injustice. Part II then delineated the 
contours of the problem, showing that although it surfaced in a marine 
oil pollution setting, it is essentially a general weakness of maritime and 
land-based common law. Finally, Part II proposed a conceptual 
framework for resolution of the problem. Generally, it held that where 
liability must be expanded beyond the limits set by the exclusionary rule 
in order to obtain certain levels of deterrence and retribution, relaxing 
the exclusionary rule and allowing more victims to recover is a more 
defensible path than awarding punitive damages to a very few successful 
claimants. 
Part III examined whether the enactment of the OPA has created a 
more defensible liability regime, using the Deepwater Horizon incident 
as a test case. The Act imposes strict but limited liability on parties 
responsible for vessels and facilities from which oil is discharged into 
U.S. waters. Responsible parties are liable for removal costs and various 
damages, including harm to natural resources and relational economic 
losses, up to the statutory caps. In the case of gross negligence, 
recklessness, or willful misconduct, liability caps are lifted, but punitive 
damages are apparently precluded. Put differently, while general 
maritime law responds to severe misconduct by allowing a very 
exclusive group of successful claimants to obtain extra-compensatory 
payments, the OPA removes the statutory limit on the defendant’s 
liability to a much more inclusive group of recognized claimants. This 
seemingly simple scheme was muddled by the “savings clauses” 
whereby states were allowed to impose additional liability for oil 
discharges. 
At first glance, the OPA seems to comply with the general guidelines 
set forth in Part II. In cases of ordinary negligence liability is limited, for 
reasons that partly overlap the traditional justifications for the 
exclusionary rule in general maritime law. In cases of more egregious 
conduct, the OPA allows expansion of liability beyond the general caps, 
for reasons that overlap the traditional justifications for punitive 
damages. The scope of liability is roughly correlated with the gravity of 
021911WDR_Perry_Post-DTP with Superfluous Digits Truncated.docx (Do Not Delete) 21/02/2011  11:09 
68 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:1 
the defendant’s conduct, and the expansion of liability in cases of severe 
misconduct better corresponds to the general principles of tort law and to 
distributive concerns. Part III showed, however, that the OPA did not 
provide a satisfactory solution for the fundamental problem. For 
example, in cases of ordinary negligence, where the caps apply, liability 
for relational losses may forestall full recovery for injuries to more 
important interests, and each victim may end up with fractional 
compensation, making the costly process futile. Also, the caps are 
somewhat arbitrary because they are insensitive to factors that seem 
relevant in determining the proper scope of liability, such as the fact that 
many relational losses are not true social costs. In cases of gross 
negligence the OPA lifts the caps altogether, although the normatively 
desirable scope of liability might be lower than the aggregate loss, 
including relational losses. Moreover, as long as the defendant is guilty 
of more than mere negligence, the OPA is insensitive to the relative 
gravity of the wrong. Furthermore, the OPA seems to preclude punitive 
damages, although there may be rare cases in which liability must 
exceed the aggregate provable loss. The savings clauses further 
complicate the situation. Allowing states to impose unlimited liability 
makes the most significant contribution of the OPA, namely liability 
caps, practically meaningless. But the possibility of awarding punitive 
damages under state law may alleviate one of its alleged shortcomings. 
Following the Deepwater Horizon incident, there have been calls for 
raising the OPA caps, or an even more comprehensive legislative 
reform. While some of the initiatives seem to have waned, this 
catastrophic incident, like the earlier Exxon Valdez case, will surely 
leave its mark. I hope that in reassessing the law applicable to marine oil 
pollution, policymakers will find some guidance in this Article, which 
highlights relevant concerns. Of course, as repeatedly noted, the Article 
has focused on a specific fact-situation, but these concerns are general 
and ought to be taken into consideration in any attempt to delineate the 
limits of civil liability. 
 
